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Partisanship and the Attorney
General of the United States:
Timely Lessons from Edward Levi
and Griffin Bell about Repairing a
Politicized Department of Justice
by Patrick E. Longan*
and James P. Fleissner**
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper role of the Attorney General of the United States has
been much in the news in recent years. William Barr received scathing
criticism for how he handled the Mueller Report regarding Russian
interference in the 2016 election; the sentencing of President Trump’s
associate, Roger Stone; the charges against President Trump’s first
national security adviser, Michael Flynn; and numerous other matters.1

* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Mercer University School of Law. A.B., Washington University, M.A., University of
Sussex, J.D., University of Chicago. Professor Longan acknowledges the financial
assistance of the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, which provided a travel grant that enabled
him to spend several weeks at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, conducting research for this project. Professor Longan also expresses his
thanks for the assistance of the staff of the Ford Library and of the Special Collections
Research Center at the University of Chicago, where Edward Levi’s papers are held.
Professor Longan thanks Mercer University for the sabbatical leave granted for the
purpose of conducting the research that led to this article. Finally, the authors gratefully
acknowledge the intrepid research assistance of Jameson Fisher, Mercer Law Class of
2021, as well as the editorial assistance of Dr. Mary Wilder and Gretchen Longan.
** Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. B.A., Marquette University, J.D.,
University of Chicago.
1 One United States District Judge who compared Attorney General Barr’s statements
about the Mueller Report and the report itself wrote in an opinion:
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Mr. Barr’s critics accused him of perverting his office from one that
served the rule of law in a nonpartisan fashion into one that catered to
President Trump’s personal and political desires.2 Many of these
critiques condemned Barr’s flouting of the traditional norms of the
Department of Justice that exist to guard against its politicization.3
Mr. Barr was not the first Attorney General to be accused of
allowing the Department of Justice to be politicized. Woodrow Wilson’s
Attorney General allegedly conducted a series of unconstitutional
“raids” on political dissidents for the purpose of furthering his political
ambitions.4 Several presidents appointed Attorneys General who had
[T]he Court cannot reconcile certain public representations made by Attorney
General Barr with the findings in the Mueller Report. The inconsistencies
between Attorney General Barr’s statements, made at a time when the public
did not have access to the redacted version of the Mueller Report to assess the
veracity of his statements, and portions of the redacted version of the Mueller
Report that conflict with those statements cause the Court to seriously
question whether Attorney General Barr made a calculated attempt to
influence public discourse about the Mueller Report in favor of President
Trump despite certain findings in the redacted version of the Mueller Report to
the contrary.
Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Justice, 442 F.
Supp. 3d 37, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2020). For a more general critique of Attorney General Barr’s
conduct as Attorney General, including a description of him as a “lickspittle” to President
Trump, see Ruth Marcus, Barr failed at his job. His bootlicking resignation letter made
POST
(Dec.
14,
2020,
9:14
AM),
that
clear,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/12/14/barr-failed-his-job-his-bootlickingresignation-letter-made-that-clear/.
2 See, e.g., Editorial Board, William Barr’s Perversion of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/opinion/sunday/michael-flynn-william-barrjustice-department.html (“The attorney general is turning the Justice department into a
political weapon for the president”).
3 See, e.g., Editorial Board, The degradation of William Barr’s Justice Department is
POST
(Feb.
12,
2020,
4:02
PM),
nearly
complete,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-roger-stone-fiasco-further-diminishes-thejustice-department/2020/02/12/d90ce0be-4dcd-11ea-9b5c-eac5b16dafaa_story.html (“Mr.
Barr should have ensured that Mr. Stone’s case was handled with strict professionalism,
as the career prosecutors sought to do, and shielded them from White House pressure,
direct or indirect. To all appearances, he did the opposite”). For a comprehensive and
highly critical review of Barr’s service as Trump’s Attorney General, see Report on the
Department of Justice and the Rule of Law Under the Tenure of Attorney General William
Barr, Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law Ad Hoc Working Group, University of
Pennsylvania, Oct. 12, 2020 (available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10900report-on-the-doj-and-the-rule-of-law).
4 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S.
2978 Before the Subcomm. on the Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate, 93d Cong. 142 (1974).
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held senior positions in their presidential campaigns.5 George W. Bush’s
Justice Department engineered the firing of numerous U.S. Attorneys,
allegedly for political reasons, and produced legal opinions that justified
the administration’s use of torture.6 Eric Holder, President Obama’s
first Attorney General, described himself as the President’s
“wing-man.”7 Obama’s second Attorney General, Loretta Lynch,
suffered withering criticism for meeting with former President Bill
Clinton while Hillary Clinton was under investigation by the FBI.8
Claims that the Department of Justice and the Office of Attorney
General have been politicized have been common throughout our
history and, in all likelihood, will continue to be so.
In recent times, the most egregious politicization of the Office of
Attorney General, at least until Barr came along, occurred during the
Nixon Administration.9 President Nixon’s first Attorney General, John
Mitchell, was the President’s close personal friend, former law partner,
and campaign manager.10 He went to prison for his role in the

5 DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1980).
6 Editorial: A rescue plan for the Justice Department, 92 JUDICATURE 4, 144 (2009);
DAVID IGLESIAS, IN JUSTICE: INSIDE THE SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2008).
7 Josh Gerstein, Eric Holder: ‘I’m still the President’s wingman,’ POLITICO44 BLOG
(Apr. 4, 2013, 12:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2013/04/eric-holder-imstill-the-presidents-wingman-160861 (when Holder was asked if he intended to stay on as
attorney general in President Obama’s second term, he said, “I’m still the President’s
wing-man, so I’m there with my boy. So we’ll see[.]”).
8 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Meeting Between Bill Clinton and Loretta Lynch Provokes
Political Furor, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/us/politics/meeting-between-bill-clinton-and-lorettalynch-provokes-political-furor.html.
9 Senator Adlai Stevenson of Illinois summed the situation up this way at the
confirmation hearings of Edward Levi as Attorney General in January 1975:
It is a sad fact that the Department of Justice was a principal victim of the
Watergate era. In past years the Department’s carefully built reputation for
evenhandedness and professionalism was abused by those who took it over.
The office of Attorney General became, for a time, a headquarters for political
dealing[.]

Nomination of Edward H. Levi to be Attorney General: Hearings before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1, 4 (Jan. 27, 1975, 10:40 AM).
10 For a description of Nixon’s relationship with Mitchell, see FRED EMERY,
WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON
10 (1994).
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Watergate scandal.11 Mitchell’s successor, Richard Kleindienst, pled
guilty to lying to Congress about President Nixon’s attempted
interference with an antitrust case.12 When events related to Watergate
forced Kleindienst’s resignation, the President appointed Elliot
Richardson, who chose to resign several months later when the
President ordered him to fire Archibald Cox, the Watergate Special
Prosecutor.13 Throughout the Watergate investigation, Henry Petersen,
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division
during the Nixon Administration, served as an “open conduit” of
information about the investigation to the President and his aides as
the Watergate cover-up proceeded.14 Petersen felt the need at one point
to tell the press, “I’m not a whore,”15 but he later reflected, “If I had to
say what the greatest crime of the Nixon administration was, I’d have
to say it was the public’s loss of confidence in the government, in the
Justice Department. It’s a lot harder to regain confidence than to lose
it.”16
In the aftermath of the Nixon Administration, both President Ford
and President Carter made commitments to depoliticize the
Department of Justice and to try to heal the scars left by Watergate.17
11 Lesley Oelsner, Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman are Sentenced to 2 ½ to 8 Years,
(Feb.
22,
1975),
Mardian
to
10
Months
to
3
Years,
N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/22/archives/mitchell-haldeman-ehrlichman-aresentenced-to-2-to-8-years-mardian.html.
12 Anthony Ripley, Kleindienst Admits Misdemeanor Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/05/17/archives/kleindienst-admits-misdemeanor-guiltaccused-of-keeping-data-from.html.
13 For an excellent and succinct description of the so-called “Saturday Night Massacre,”
see KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 1, 338–58 (1997).
14 Id. at 56. John Dean, Nixon’s White House Counsel and the coordinator of the
Watergate cover-up, is the one who described Petersen as a “open conduit” and also said
of Petersen: “He told me everything I needed to know. And then some.” Id.
15 Peter Osnos & Richard M. Cohen, Key Petersen Role in Probe Shown, WASH. POST
(May 3, 1974) reprinted in Removing Politics, supra note 4, at 505–08.
16 Mitchell C. Lynch, Rebuilding Morale at Justice, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 1975).
17 At Levi’s memorial service in 2000, President Ford reflected on that commitment:
“Within months of taking office I found myself looking for a new Attorney General. No
more critical decision would cross my desk. The situation demanded someone of towering
intellect and spotless integrity. No campaign managers need apply, nor members of the
family, official or political.” Gerald R. Ford’s Remarks at the Memorial Service for Ed Levi,
April 6, 2000 (photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library, on file with authors). Griffin Bell
described his and President Carter’s approach to the alleged partisanship of the
Department of Justice in this way:
I happen to understand, with Governor Carter, that, if I am to be the Attorney
General, we want to professionalize the Department of Justice. We want to
depoliticize it to the extent possible. Otherwise, I would not care to be the
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President Ford chose Edward H. Levi, a legal scholar and President of
the University of Chicago, to serve as Attorney General. President
Carter turned to Griffin Bell, a Georgia lawyer who had served for
almost fifteen years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
On a personal level, Levi and Bell were remarkably different. Levi
was a bow-tied academic who spent most of his working life at the
University of Chicago.18 He had an earned reputation for being
“prickly.”19 In contrast, Judge Bell was a gregarious raconteur who, it
was said, “could light up any room with his personal warmth and
entertain all with his stories drawn from a life of incredible depth and
breadth.”20 These two very different men were asked by the presidents
who appointed them to do the same thing: to restore the credibility and
morale of the Department of Justice in the wake of Watergate.21
The historical judgment is that they succeeded. In the 1970s,
Congressman Pete McCloskey opined that President Ford’s “greatest
contribution to the Nation may perhaps turn out to be his appointment
of the nonpolitician, Edward Levi, as Attorney General—and the
preserving of the Attorney General’s independence from presidential
influence in matters of political concern . . . .”22 McCloskey stated that
with the appointment of Bell, President Carter “continued the tradition
of independence . . . .”23 In 2018, a columnist in the New York Times
wrote: “[F]or all their differences, Levi and Bell came to share a

Attorney General; he would not care for me to be the Attorney General, either.
His ideas and mine are the same on that.
The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, of Georgia, to be Attorney General,
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 95th Cong. 1, 20
(1977).
18 See Victor S. Navasky, The Attorney General as scholar, not enforcer, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 1975).
19 This was one of the comments of George Schultz about Levi relayed by President
Ford’s Chief of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld, to Ford’s White House counsel, Philip Buchen,
when Buchen was vetting the suggestion of nominating Levi as Attorney General. Notes
on individuals being considered for attorney general, Dec. 1974, folder: Justice–
Personnel–Attorney General (1), box 24, Philip Buchen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
20 John C. Bell, Jr., President’s Foreword, 18 J.S. LEGAL HIST. viii (2010).
21 The authors note that each knew both Levi and Bell, although not well. Levi taught
both authors at the University of Chicago Law School, and the authors came to know
Judge Bell when they joined the faculty of Bell’s alma mater, Mercer University School of
Law.
22 H.R. 96-280, 96th Cong. 1, 28 (1979).
23 Id.
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mission. Together they created the modern Department of Justice and,
more important, the modern American idea of the rule of law . . . .”24
More recently, at the press conference at which President Biden
introduced Merrick Garland as his nominee for Attorney General,
Judge Garland noted that when he took his first job at the Justice
Department in the late 1970s, “Ed Levi and Griffin Bell, the first
attorneys general appointed after Watergate, had enunciated the norms
that would ensure the department’s adherence to the rule of law.”25
The deeper question is how Levi and Bell accomplished that task.
They did not do so by sitting in their offices and exuding integrity. Levi
had to deal with the issues of the day, including Watergate
prosecutions, busing, gun control, intelligence gathering, an
appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States, criminal
justice reform, and the Presidential campaign of 1976. Levi once
described the job as “one damn thing after another.”26
The same was true for Bell. He had to make decisions whether to
investigate and prosecute powerful Congressmen and high officials of
the FBI and CIA. He helped formulate the government’s position in
politically explosive cases involving affirmative action, civil rights, and
the handover of the Panama Canal.27 The lessons of how Levi and Bell
restored the Department of Justice and the Office of Attorney General

24 David Leonhardt, The Sense of Justice We’re Losing, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/opinion/the-sense-of-justice-that-were-losing.html.
25 Biden introduces Merrick Garland as nominee for attorney general, YOUTUBE, (Jan.
7, 2021), (23:45), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtJOJ2jayPw.
26 Katherine Graham, In Memoriam: Edward H. Levi (1912–2000), 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
979, 980 (2000). This was no exaggeration. Just weeks after Levi was sworn in, James
Lynn, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, sent the president a
memorandum with suggested topics for the president’s upcoming meeting with Levi. The
memo listed rising crime, the need for more data about the cost of crime, coordination of
federal law enforcement activities, antitrust enforcement, and the need to improve the
FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Memorandum, Lynn to Ford,
Feb. 27, 1975, folder: Justice, Edward H. Levi, box 2, James E. Connor Papers, Gerald R.
Ford Library. The list for Merrick Garland is, if anything, longer and more daunting.
Jennifer Rubin, Opinion: What Merrick Garland should tell us, WASH. POST (Jan. 17,
2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/17/what-merrickgarland-should-tell-us/.
27 For general background of Bell’s time as Attorney General, see GRIFFIN B. BELL
WITH RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW (1982). For discussion of some
selected events, see REG MURPHY, UNCOMMON SENSE 1, 189–248 (1999). A more
contemporaneous survey of issues he faced when he took office appears in Richard E.
Cohen, Griffin Bell—The Georgia ‘Outsider’ Finds Some Problems ‘Inside,’ THE NATIONAL
JOURNAL (Sept. 24, 1977).
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are not abstract. The lessons are instead embedded in the way Levi and
Bell conducted themselves in office.
Those lessons, whatever they may be, are not just of academic
interest. Levi presciently noted that the day might come when another
Attorney General would have to build the Department of Justice back
up after a period of politicization. In his farewell address to Department
employees on January 17, 1977, as he was about to hand over the
leadership of the Department to Bell, Levi said, “We have shown that
the administration of justice can be fair, can be effective, can be
non-partisan. These are goals that can never be won for all time. They
must always be won anew.”28 Senator Abourzek gave the same warning
in a more colorful way during the confirmation hearings for Griffin Bell:
“There might be a future Richard Nixon, God forbid.”29 An
understanding of how Ed Levi and Griffin Bell led the Department of
Justice back from the wreckage of Watergate will be useful whenever
the time comes to “win anew” the goal of a nonpartisan, depoliticized
Department of Justice.
In the eyes of many observers, we have now entered one of those
times. William Barr’s conduct as Attorney General led thousands of
former officials to call for his resignation, first for his handling of the
Roger Stone case,30 and later for his actions in connection with the
Michael Flynn case.31 There were calls for Barr to be impeached.32 Some
of Barr’s own prosecutors resigned from positions, cases, and even from
government service rather than support some of his actions.33 Barr left

28 Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States, Farewell Remarks of the
Honorable Edward H. Levi Before the Employees of the U.S. Department of Justice 2
(Jan. 17, 1977, 3:30 PM), transcript available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/01-17-1977.pdf.
29 The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell supra note 17, at 114 (statement of
Sen. James Abourzek).
30 Katie Benner, Former Justice Dept. Lawyers Press for Barr to Step Down, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/16/us/politics/barr-trump-justicedepartment.html.
31 Alexandra Sternlicht, 2,000 Former FBI and DOJ Officials Call On Barr To Resign,
FORBES (May 11, 2020, 3:23 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrasternlicht/2020/05/11/2000-former-fbi-and-dojofficials-call-on-barr-to-resign/?sh=57f1a909171e.
32 See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, U.S. ethics groups say Barr uses DOJ as political tool, call
(Oct.
12,
2020,
7:18
PM),
for
his
impeachment,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-barr/u-s-ethics-groups-say-barr-uses-dojas-political-tool-call-for-his-impeachment-idUSKBN26X2RS.
33 See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Devlin Barrett, Ann E. Marimow, and Spencer S. Hsu,
Prosecutors quit amid escalating Justice Dept. fight over Roger Stone’s prison term, WASH.
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the credibility and morale of the Department of Justice in tatters.34
When it emerged that then-President-elect Joe Biden intended to
nominate Judge Merrick Garland to serve as Attorney General, it was
reported that “Garland’s selection also echoed the decision in 1975 by
President Gerald Ford to tap Edward H. Levi, a legal scholar and
president of the University of Chicago, to restore credibility to the
department in the post-Watergate era.”35 This is a time when the
lessons of Levi’s and of Bell’s service will prove useful.
The purpose of this Article is to start the process of discerning those
lessons for use now and any future time when an Attorney General
takes office in the aftermath of a period of politicization of the
Department of Justice. Part II provides background about the Office of
the Attorney General and describes the distinction between an Attorney
General’s roles in “politics” as policy and “politics” as partisanship. Part
III discusses the specific circumstances of the Watergate scandal and
how it affected the Department of Justice. In Parts IV and V, we
examine one episode from Levi’s time as Attorney General and one from
Bell’s tenure, as examples from which future Attorneys General might
learn. There is not enough room in one article to examine all of the
issues they faced, but we hope that the two episodes we have chosen are
instructive.
Professor Daniel Meador, who served in the Department of Justice
in the Carter Administration, once wrote that the successive

POST (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:44 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/justicedept-to-reduce-sentencing-recommendation-for-trump-associate-roger-stone-official-saysafter-president-calls-it-unfair/2020/02/11/ad81fd36-4cf0-11ea-bf44f5043eb3918a_story.html; see also Katie Benner and Michael S. Schmidt, Barr Hands
Prosecutors the Authority to Investigate Voter Fraud Claims, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/barr-elections.html.
34 TIME magazine summed up the problem this way:
That partial damage to the public perception of the Justice Department, former
officials say, leaves a tricky dynamic waiting for Biden and his Attorney
General next year. “When you have a reputation for integrity, if you lose it, it’s
very hard to get it back,” says John Bies, a former Justice Department official
under President Obama who is now chief counsel at American Oversight. “The
same is true for the Justice Department. Once it loses that reputation,
restoring it is actually a very hard task.”
Tessa Berenson, How Joe Biden and His New Attorney General Can Repair the
Justice Department’s Reputation, TIME (Dec. 21, 2020, 12:53 AM),
https://time.com/5921187/joe-biden-attorney-general-justice-department-challenges/.
35 Matt Zapotosky, Devlin Barrett, and Ann E. Marimow, Biden plans to nominate
Merrick Garland as his attorney general, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2021, 5:50 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/merrick-garland-biden-attorneygeneral/2021/01/06/071053ce-2dd4-11eb-bae0-50bb17126614_story.html.
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appointments of Levi and Bell gave rise to the hope that thereafter
Attorney Generals would “be in that mold . . . .”36 That hope proved
forlorn, but the service of Levi and Bell may at least provide a template
for when an Attorney General takes office in the wake of a predecessor
whose service was not in the independent tradition that Levi and Bell
exemplified.
II. POLITICS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Before we take a look at what went wrong in Watergate and how
Levi and Bell acted to bring the Department of Justice back on track,
we need to put the Attorney General’s job in some context. That
requires an understanding of the difference between an Attorney
General who acts properly as a politically appointed member of a
President’s administration and an Attorney General who abuses the
office for partisan political purposes. It is also important to appreciate
why such abuses are possible and so dangerous, and to examine what it
takes to prevent them.37
A. Politics as Policy vs. Politics as Partisanship
No one defends the “politicization” of the Department of Justice. That
term, however, requires some examination. Sometimes it is suggested
that the Attorney General should be “apolitical” or that the Department
of Justice should be independent of presidential control.38 These
suggestions miss the mark because the job of the Attorney General
inevitably and rightly involves issues of public policy, and decisions
about how those issues are handled should be in the hands ultimately of

36 Daniel J. Meador, Griffin Bell at the Intersection of Law and Politics: The
Department of Justice, 1977–1979, 18 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 291, 302–03 (2010).
37 For general background on the Office of the Attorney General and the Department of
Justice, see CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (2015); CORNELL W. CLAYTON, GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS (1995); NANCY
V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE, 1789–1990 (1992); MEADOR, supra note 5. A number of former Attorney Generals
met and discussed the complexities of the job at a 1992 conference at the Hastings Law
School. THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, https://c-span.org/video/?35169-1/officeattorney-general (discussion of the scope of the job occurs in the first ten minutes of the
program).
38 The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee held
several days of hearings in 1974 about making the Department of Justice independent of
the president. Removing Politics, supra note 4.
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people who are elected and responsible to the voters.39 Much of a
President’s policy agenda might relate to the work of the Department of
Justice. Decisions about antitrust enforcement relate to economic
policy. Choices about how and when to enforce immigration laws can be
important to foreign affairs, civil rights, and the composition of the
work force. Whether to concentrate resources on the reform of policing
practices or on combatting a rising crime rate will reflect policy
judgments upon which a president may have campaigned. As a member
of the President’s cabinet and as a political appointee, the Attorney
General inevitably plays a role in the formulation and execution of the
president’s approach to governing.40 There is nothing insidious about
that.
There is a difference, however, between being engaged in
politics-as-policy and politics-as-partisanship.41 The former is about the
exercise of power duly granted to the President, and delegated to the
Attorney General, as a result of democratic elections. The latter is about
the use of the powers of the Office of the Attorney General for improper
purposes such as to enhance or harm the political prospects of friends or
foes or to administer the laws differently for people or institutions that
are favored or disfavored by the President, the Attorney General, or
others who are in power. The use of the powers of office for such
Id. at 119:
It seems right, not wrong, to me that an administration give policy direction
on such matters as busing, employment quotas, school district consolidations,
and private discrimination in places of public accommodations. . . . It seems to
me that under our political system Presidential candidates are entitled to run,
and—more important—the nation’s voters are entitled to vote for candidates
on such issues.
Prepared Statement of Burke Marshall, former Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division.
40 William Rehnquist, who later served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
then as Chief Justice of the United States, expressed the need for the Attorney General to
be part of the public policy team of the President (at the time Rehnquist was an Assistant
Attorney General):
The plain fact of the matter is that any President, and any Attorney General,
wants his immediate underlings to be not only competent attorneys, but to be
politically and philosophically attuned to the policies of the administration.
This is not peculiar to the Department of Justice, it is a common feature in
staffing of virtually all of the Cabinet departments in the executive branch of
Government.
39

Id. at 41 (quoted in testimony of Mitchell Rogovin, General Counsel of Common
Cause).
41 For an excellent general discussion of this distinction, and the difficulty in making it
sometimes, see GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 16–21.
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partisan or personal purposes is what it means for the Department of
Justice to be “politicized.” Such activities are abuses of power.
B. Why Politicization is Possible and Why it is Dangerous
It is important to understand how the Department can become
politicized and how dangerous it is. First, recognize that the leaders of
the Department of Justice have enormous discretionary power. An
Attorney General or U.S. Attorney, for example, has broad prosecutorial
discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting
or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by
accepting guilty pleas.42 The Attorney General or the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (part of the Justice Department)
might choose to make announcements about the existence or results of
pending investigations, or not to do so.43 On behalf of (or at least with
the agreement of) the President, an Attorney General can dismiss a
U.S. Attorney without cause.44 Through the Solicitor General, the
Department of Justice may file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court
without leave of the Court, but there is nothing that requires it to do
so.45 Justice Department attorneys have discretion in how they handle
information they learn in the course of an investigation (other than
grand jury information) and, for the most part, to decide what witnesses
will be brought before a grand jury.46 The exercise of such discretion is,
for all intents and purposes, unreviewable.

U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.110 (2018).
Perhaps the most famous examples are the decisions of James Comey as Director of
the FBI to go public (twice) about the investigation into the handling of Hillary Clinton’s
emails when she was Secretary of State, in contrast to the FBI’s silence about Russian
interference in the 2016 presidential election. See JAMES COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY, 1,
164 (2018) (“In October 2016, there was no good reason for the FBI to speak about the
Russians and the election . . . . But ‘avoid action’ was not an option when the Clinton
email investigation came back to my office in October in a powerful and unexpected
way . . . .”).
44 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (“Each United States Attorney is subject to removal by the
President”).
45 U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 37 (“No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if
the brief is presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General.”).
46 When Henry Petersen testified before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities (commonly known as the Senate Watergate Committee), he stated
that the decision about sharing information with others in the executive branch, such as
members of the White House staff, was not as a matter of legalities but rather was a
matter of “prudence.” Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong. 3615 (1973) (transcript available at
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/003212943). Prudence is another word for discretion.
42
43
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Because so many of the powers of the Attorney General are matters
of unreviewable discretion, there are few enforceable guardrails against
their abuse. For example, the Justice Manual of the Department of
Justice has guidelines for charging decisions and numerous other
discretionary decisions that prosecutors make, but the Justice Manual
is an internal document that does not carry the force of law.47 Similarly,
the Department for a long time has had written policies about not
revealing information that might help or hurt a candidate in the ninety
days before an election, but there is no formal sanction for violating
them.48 If an Attorney General or other Department of Justice official
were tempted to use their discretion for improper purposes, to a large
extent they are free to do so without formal constraints.
Such power is dangerous if it is misused. At an individual level, use
of the powers of the Department of Justice can have grave
consequences. Anyone who is subjected to prosecution may suffer in
ways that are ruinous to reputation and solvency even if they are
acquitted.49 A U.S. Attorney who is fired for not targeting members of
the opposing party, or for too vigorously investigating the President,
47 The Justice Manual recognizes that the guidelines will only be effective if
Department of Justice lawyers choose to follow its guidelines: “Important though these
principles are to the proper operation of our prosecutorial system, the success of that
system must rely ultimately on the character, integrity, sensitivity, and competence of
those men and women who are selected to represent the public interest in the federal
criminal justice process.” Just. Manual § 9-27.110, supra note 42.
48 For background on the so-called 90-day rule, particularly in the context of FBI
Director James Comey’s violation of it in 2016, see Eric Holder, James Comey Is A Good
Man, But He Made A Serious Mistake, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/eric-holder-james-comey-is-a-good-man-but-hemade-a-serious-mistake/2016/10/30/08e7208e-9f07-11e6-8832-23a007c77bb4_story.html;
Jamie Gorelick and Larry Thompson, James Comey is Damaging Our Democracy, WASH.
POST (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/james-comey-isdamaging-our-democracy/2016/10/29/894d0f5e-9e49-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html;
Jane Chong, Pre-Election Disclosures: How Does, and Should, DOJ Analyze Edge Cases,
LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/pre-electiondisclosures-how- does-and-should-doj-analyze-edge-cases.
49 See, e.g., Herb Jackson, Justice Department moves to drop corruption case against
New Jersey Sen. Bob Menendez, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2018, 4:49 PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/31/justice-department-asks-dropmenendez-indictment-ending-case-launched-2015/1083038001/ (“Though he has been
cleared, the charges and 11-week trial have taken their toll on the 64-year-old Democrat.
Menedez is currently one of the least popular senators in the country . . . .”); John
Kennedy, Once-Mighty Politician Back to Help Chiles, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 16,
1995), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1995-07-16-9507160104-story.html
(reporting on story of Mallory Horne, a Florida politician who was acquitted of money
laundering but “left the courthouse personally and financially ruined”).
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will face a career disruption if not a derailment.50 Having the weight of
the federal government brought into a civil case could change the result
for the disfavored party.51 And making public the results of an
investigation might sway an election.52
There are also more general types of harm that can flow from the
decisions of a politicized Attorney General. The first is the undermining
of the legitimacy of the rule of law itself. If the public perceives that the
law means one thing for a supporter of the President and another for an
opponent, people lose faith in the rule of law.53 Law is supposed to be
neutral, and that is one reason why it works: people voluntarily comply
with the law when it is perceived to be legitimate.54 But once its
legitimacy is undermined, the law becomes just another partisan
weapon to be deployed.55
See IGLESIAS, supra note 6.
One example of this may be Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978). One scholar described how the Justice Department changed its position
in the process of writing its amicus brief, and “[t]he Justice Department’s brief no doubt
influenced the Court’s plurality decision, which not surprisingly adopted the same
position.” GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 19.
52 There has been much speculation that FBI Director James Comey’s revelations
about the investigation into Hillary Clinton led to Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016
presential election. See, e.g., Andrew Buncombe, Bill Clinton: FBI Director James Comey
‘cost’ Hillary the presidential election, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 19, 2016, 3:27 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/bill-clinton-fbi-directorjames-comey-cost-hillary-clinton-presidential-election-donald-trump-a7484636.html.
Comey stands by his decision. COMEY, supra note 43, at 178 (“The 2016 presidential
election was like no other for the FBI, and even knowing what I know now, I wouldn’t
have done it differently, but I can imagine good and principled people in my shoes making
different choices about some things”).
53 Levi recognized the importance of perception. On May 21, 1976, he gave an address
to the American Law Institute in which he said:
One concern, which I believe is of general importance, is the image of the
department of Justice. It is well enough to say that in the long run it is the
reality and not the image which counts, but because of past events and because
of the ways of our present society, the reality can become lost in the constant
stream of images which may be quite false.
50
51

Remarks, Levi, May 21, 1976, folder: Law Enforcement—Remarks by Edward Levi,
box 4, A. James Reichley Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library. Senator Alan Cranston, quoting
Senator Sam Ervin, put the point this way: “A cornerstone of our system of justice is the
faith of the American people in that system and their belief in its fairness.” Removing
Politics, supra note 4, at 9.
54 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 1, 62 (1990); see also Removing Politics,
supra note 4, at 9, 151.
55 Ed Levi once criticized the notion that the “struggle for power is what is truly and
only genuine” by saying that such a claim “diminishes reason, disparages the ideal of the
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Furthermore, misuse of power by one Attorney General may beget
abuse by the next, as when a new Attorney General is urged to engage
in payback for the misdeeds of the last.56 Perhaps more subtly, abuse of
power by the Attorney General undermines the morale and therefore
the effectiveness of the career personnel in the Department of Justice,
most of whom serve during multiple presidential administrations of
both parties. They serve best when they have faith that the Attorney
General is supporting them in their mission: the application of the law
equally to everyone, without fear or favor. When they see their
judgments reversed or ignored, or see years of effort thrown away, for
partisan reasons, it is demoralizing.57 The effective and fair
administration of the law depends upon the day-to-day efforts of these
career professionals, and abuses at the highest levels take a toll.
C. The Primacy of Character
Because the potential for abuse of the Attorney General’s broad
discretionary power is largely unconstrained by law or other
common or public good, and adds legitimacy to the notion that law is only one more
instrument among many to be manipulated.” Edward H. Levi, In the Service of the
Republic: A Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, in RESTORING
JUSTICE: THE SPEECHES OF ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWARD H. LEVI, 45 (Jack Fuller, ed.)
(2013).
56 This issue is sure to receive much attention, regardless of whether the Biden Justice
Department decides to prosecute Donald Trump or other members of the Trump
Administration for crimes allegedly committed while Trump was President. For a glimpse
at the debate, see Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion: Should Trump Be Prosecuted?, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/opinion/trump-bidenprosecute.html.
57 The effect of politicization on morale at the Department of Justice is a consistent
refrain whenever it appears that partisanship is motivating decisions. See Richard E.
Cohen, Justice Report—Richardson Moves to Assert His Control of Watergate-Shaken
Justice Department, NATIONAL JOURNAL (July 14, 1973) (reprinted in Removing Politics,
supra note 4, at 487–95) (listing reasons for low morale at the Department of Justice in
1973). For a sample of such comments relating to William Barr, see Matt Zapotosky and
Karoun Demirjian, Analysts say William Barr is eroding Justice Department
independence–without facing any real personal consequence, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020,
6:51
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/analysts-say-barr-iseroding-justice-department-independence--without-facing-any-real-personalconsequence/2020/06/24/459778ca-b647-11ea-a8da-693df3d7674a_story.html
(“[m]orale
inside the Justice Department has plummeted, according to several Justice Department
employees who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the matter frankly”);
Robert Storace, Morale Low at Department of Justice Under William Barr’s Leadership,
Ex-Staffers
Say,
LAW.COM
(Feb.
19,
2020,
5:32
PM),
https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2020/02/19/morale-low-at-department-of-justice-underwilliam-barrs-leadership-ex-staffers-say/?slreturn=20210020141917.
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formalities, and because such abuses are so destructive, it is crucial
that the Attorney General be a person with a particular character.
When there are so few guardrails, character counts. It matters who
holds the job.
Previous holders of the office recognized the importance of character
at the Department of Justice. Harlan Fiske Stone took over as Attorney
General in the aftermath of the controversial actions of his predecessor,
Harry Daughtery.58 Stone’s biographer noted that Stone emphasized
the need for character.59 Daughtery “showed that an ‘impassable gap’
lay between law ‘as a mere statement of rules of conduct and the
effective translation of those rules and the actual control of human
action . . . .’”60 To Stone, Daughtery’s tenure in office proved that the
most important step in law enforcement was “improvement in the
training, character, and morale of those to whom its administration is
primarily committed.”61 Levi agreed. At his confirmation hearings, Levi
testified, “I suppose the primary basis for insulating personnel from
improper conduct has to be their own moral conscience and the
collective morality of the Department of Justice.”62 Similarly, Griffin
Bell referred to character in response to a question during his
confirmation hearings about whether there ought to be a rebuttable or a
conclusive presumption against the confirmation of an Attorney
General who has been active in politics:
If it is conclusive, I might better go back to Atlanta. If it is
rebuttable, then I think you will have to consider my record. You will
have to decide if I am independent enough and have sufficient
integrity to do what Governor Carter agreed I should do. That is to
depoliticize the Justice Department, and to professionalize it and run
it as an independent law department of the Nation. If you think I can
do that, then I think you will have decided that such presumption as
you raise has been rebutted. Otherwise, you ought to vote against
me.63

Character clearly is key to doing the job right.
From time to time, there has been serious consideration of
structural changes to the Attorney General’s job rather than relying on

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 141–44 (1956).
Id. at 149.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Nomination of Edward H. Levi, supra note 9, at 21.
63 The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, supra note 17, at 136.
58
59
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the appointment of people with the right character. But when Senator
Sam Ervin held several days of hearings, in the midst of the Watergate
scandal, about the possibility of making the Department of Justice
independent of the President to prevent future episodes of politicization
of the Department, almost all the witnesses repeated the same theme:
the problem was the lack of character of those who had politicized the
Department, and the solution was to find people of integrity to serve.64
In 1980, the University of Virginia convened a conference and
considered a proposal to split the Department of Justice into two
departments as another way of using structural reform to guard against
partisanship.65 In the paper he prepared for the conference, Professor
Meador wrote:
Whether or not institutional rearrangements are undertaken to
elevate the Attorney General to the position of chief lawyer free of
other responsibilities, the single most important element in the fair
and lawful administration of federal justice is the person who
occupies that office. Whatever the structure, the best assurance that
the role of the Attorney General is carried out as it should be lies in
the selection of highly competent lawyers of integrity and
appropriate professional independence.66

Again, the refrain is that the most important thing about avoiding
the abuse of the discretionary power of the Department of Justice is the
character of the person who serves as Attorney General.
D. The Indispensable Component of Character for an Attorney General:
Independence
When former Attorneys General and others speak about the
necessary “character” of an Attorney General, they are essentially all
talking about one thing: independence. For an Attorney General to be
willing and able to put aside partisan considerations, he or she must act
independently in the sense that personal or political interests,
especially those of the President, are subordinated to proper
considerations. This much is clear. What requires more analysis is the

64 Removing Politics, supra note 4 at 16, 25 (statements of Theodore Sorensen), 74
(statement of Richard Kleindienst), 136, 138, 143 (statements of Charles Goodell), 204,
209 (statements of Archibald Cox).
65 MEADOR, supra note 5.
66 Id. at 68.
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set of conditions necessary for an Attorney General to act with such
independence.
To a great extent, this sense of independence is a function of how the
President views the role of the Attorney General. When Biden
introduced Merrick Garland as his Attorney General nominee and his
nominees for other senior positions in the Department of Justice, Biden
said, “You won’t work for me. You are not the president’s or the vice
president’s lawyer. Your loyalty is not to me. It’s to the law, the
Constitution, the people of this nation.”67 President Ford made clear
that he wanted Levi to be apolitical and that the Department of Justice
would be independent with respect to legal decisions.68 Jimmy Carter
told Griffin Bell and the public that the Justice Department must be a
“neutral zone” free of partisan politics.69 In contrast, Donald Trump
constantly insisted on “loyalty” from his Attorneys General (and
everyone else) and bitterly complained when he did not get it.70 A
supportive president makes independence easier.
Independence also relates to the extent to which the Attorney
General values other things, such as reputation, personal honor, or
legacy, more than the power and prestige of the office. When Ed Levi
was asked about whether he would consider resigning if the President
asked him to follow a policy with which Levi disagreed, Levi responded
that, if it is something he could not in good conscience support, he
would resign. He said, “I assume that the President has asked me to
take this job because he is interested in impartial administration of
justice . . . there is a proper loyalty we all recognize as lawyers to the
idea of law itself.”71 Senator Kennedy asked Levi how he would respond
to pressure from the White House or from a member of Congress.72 Levi
responded that he would call things as he saw them because “ultimately

Biden introduces Merrick Garland as nominee for attorney general, supra note 25.
Notes of interview of Levi by Reichley 1, Jan. 24, 1991, folder: Domestic Policy Levi,
Edward, box 2, James Reichley Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
69 Interview by James S. Young with Griffin Bell (Mar. 23, 1988) (transcript available
at
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/griffin-bell-oralhistory) (“I never had any trouble with President Carter about anything. He was very
supportive of the Justice Department. He wanted to have it as a neutral department. He
had a high respect for the law”).
70 See, e.g., Philip Bump, Trump Wanted an attorney general who’d be loyal to him. He
POST
(Sept.
9,
2020,
10:20
AM),
got
one.,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/09/trump-wanted-an-attorney-generalwhod-be-loyal-him-he-got-one/.
71 Nomination of Edward H. Levi, supra note 9, at 39.
72 Id. at 23.
67
68
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I do not feel any reason to give into pressure of any kind. I really have
to ask myself, why should I?”73 Griffin Bell also testified that he would
rather resign than take any improper actions, in part because “I have
my own reputation to worry about. As a good lawyer and a good
person . . . .”74 Elliott Richardson resigned rather than follow President
Nixon’s order to fire the Watergate Special Prosecutor because
Richardson had given his word in his confirmation hearings that he
would not do so absent extraordinary impropriety.75 William Barr, on
the other hand, has professed not to care what others think. He
expressed indifference to the question of how history would judge his
decisions by saying that “history is written by the winners.”76
Attorneys General who do not cling too tightly to the power and
prestige of the office are also more likely to be independent. Ed Levi’s
response to President Ford’s offer of the job was that he needed it “like
a hole in the head.”77 He frankly looked on the attorney generalship as a
demotion from his position as President of the University of Chicago.78
Similarly, when Griffin Bell took office, he had recently relinquished
the power and prestige of the office of a U.S. Circuit Judge for
something he decided he valued more: the chance to practice law again
in Atlanta with King & Spalding.79 In his confirmation hearings, he
emphasized his independence and his willingness to leave office if
necessary: “If Governor Carter—I think he knows I’m independent. He
has made a mistake if he doesn’t know I’m independent . . . . He knows I
would be glad to leave.”80
Even with a President’s support, a value system that supports
non-partisanship, and a loose grip on the perquisites of office, acting
Id.
The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, supra note 17, at 137.
75 Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
21,
1973),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm.
76 Mairead Mcardle, Barr Defends DOJ Dropping Case against Michael Flynn: “It
Upheld the Rule of Law,” NATIONAL REVIEW (May 11, 2020, 9:36 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/barr-defends-doj-dropping-case-against-michaelflynn-history-is-written-by-the-winners/ (“‘Well, history is written by the winners,’ Barr
responded. ‘So it largely depends on who’s writing the history’”).
77 Navasky, supra note 18, at 9.
78 Id. at 1. When White House staff suggested that Levi make the customary courtesy
calls on senators as part of the confirmation process, Levi initially resisted. He said that
he “didn’t really think that the president of the University of Chicago should go around
looking for a job.” Id. at 2.
79 See MURPHY, supra note 27, at 137–43.
80 The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, supra note 17, at 137.
73
74
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independently will sometimes require an attorney general to deploy
personal virtues. First, it takes wisdom to discern the line between an
action that is political but legitimate as a tool of policy from one that is
illegitimate as partisan.81 These things do not come labeled. Even with
that discernment, it takes courage to act in ways that others, especially
others in powerful positions, will dislike and perhaps publicly criticize.
It is also important to acknowledge that not every judgment will be
right, and sometimes even correct judgments are implemented poorly.
Maintaining independence over time requires humility to learn from
mistakes and the resilience to come back to fight another day. Acting
independently, like other moral actions, requires the deployment of the
virtues necessary to the particular situation.82
In sum, for an attorney general to do the job right, and resist
pressure to use the powers of the office for partisan advantage, the
attorney general must be a person who has the values and virtues
necessary to be independent. We believe Ed Levi and Griffin Bell are
excellent examples of such independence and that they demonstrated
that capacity as they repaired the damage done to the Justice
Department under President Nixon. To set the scene for Levi’s and
Bell’s service as Attorneys General, we now turn to the events of the
Nixon years that made such restoration necessary.
III. PARTISANSHIP AND THE NIXON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The need for Levi and Bell to restore the credibility and morale of
the Department of Justice arose from the politicization of the
Department during the Nixon Administration. For our purposes, we
need not set forth an exhaustive history of what happened in the
Department between 1969 and 1974. There are numerous excellent
comprehensive resources on the subject.83 Rather, we will focus on some
of the specific choices that the Department of Justice officials made that

81 MEADOR, supra note 5, at 79–80 (the interrelationships of the attorney general and
the president are questions of “wisdom and appropriateness” rather than legalities)
(comments of John Shenefield). See also Removing Politics, supra note 4, at 21 (“[T]he
greatest stress we ever meet is when we have to choose between conflicting loyalties”)
(statement of Senator Ervin).
82 For an excellent exploration of using practical wisdom to choose a course of action
when multiple values are relevant to a particular situation, see BARRY SCHWARTZ AND
KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO THE RIGHT THING (2010).
83 See, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, THE NIXON DEFENSE: WHAT HE KNEW AND WHEN HE KNEW
IT (2014); EMERY, supra note 10; FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Rep. No. 93-981 (1973).
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left the Department with such low credibility and morale when Levi
took over in February 1975.
John Mitchell served as Nixon’s first Attorney General for just over
thirty-six months, from January 21, 1969 to March 1, 1972. At his
confirmation hearings, he reassured the Judiciary Committee that his
close political and personal relationship with President Nixon would not
interfere with the proper discharge of his duties:
Senator Ervin: Mr. Mitchell, until comparatively recent years it has
been customary for Presidents to appoint the Postmaster General his
chief political adviser and agitator. Unfortunately, during recent
years this role has been largely taken away from the Postmaster
General and given to and exercised by the Attorney General. To my
mind there is something incompatible with marrying the function of
the chief political adviser and chief agitator with that of prosecutor of
crimes against the Government. Now, I would just like to know
whether you think that the primary function and objective of the
Attorney General should be giving political advice or doing political
agitating before congressional committees or enforcing Federal law
and acting as an adviser to the President in his Cabinet in legal
matters rather than political.
Mr. Mitchell: Senator, I would hope that my activities in a political
nature and of a political nature have ended with the campaign. I
might say that this was my first entry into a political campaign, and
I trust it will be my last. From the termination of the campaign and
henceforward my duties and functions will be related to the Justice
Department, and as the legal and not the political adviser of the
President.84

Mitchell’s hope that his political activities ended with the 1968
campaign was not to be fulfilled. The President prevailed upon Mitchell
to step down as Attorney General effective on March 1, 1972, in order to
take charge of the re-election campaign. As a result of actions Mitchell
took while he was Attorney General and thereafter in connection with
the Watergate affair, Mitchell eventually spent nineteen months in
prison, after he was convicted of conspiracy and obstruction of justice.
The series of events that led John Mitchell from the fifth floor of the
Department of Justice to a prison cell began because President Nixon

84 Removing Politics, supra note 4, at 38 (citing Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary on John N. Mitchell, Attorney General-Designate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 14,
1969)).
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had an “insatiable need” for political intelligence.85 In early 1972, the
Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) hired G. Gordon Liddy as
its new General Counsel.86 Liddy’s experience for the job included
illegal and clandestine work for the White House. He was involved in
the burglary of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, the psychiatrist of
Daniel Ellsburg, a former Pentagon official who had leaked the
“Pentagon Papers” (an internal Department of Defense study that was
critical of the Vietnam War) to the New York Times.87 One of Liddy’s
jobs for CREEP was to organize an intelligence operation, and he
developed some grandiose plans.
On January 27, 1972, about six weeks before Mitchell was to step
down as Attorney General to lead the re-election campaign, Liddy went
to Mitchell’s office at the Department of Justice and presented his plans
and a proposed budget for “Operation Gemstone.” The plans included
the use of “high-end” prostitutes to entrap prominent Democrats, the
kidnapping of the leaders of any demonstrators at the Republican
national convention, and electronic surveillance.88 Liddy was asking for
approval and a million dollars in funding, in the office of the Attorney
General of the United States, for an elaborate set of criminal activities.
Mitchell merely puffed his pipe and told Liddy that his plan was “not
quite what he had in mind.”89 Mitchell later testified that he “should
have thrown him out the window,”90 but instead his instructions were to
come back with something not quite so elaborate and expensive.91
Eight days later, on February 4, 1972, Liddy made another
presentation to Mitchell, again in Mitchell’s office at the Department of
Justice.92 Although the plans presented at this meeting were not as
elaborate as the original “Operation Gemstone,” they still included
kidnapping and electronic surveillance.93 John Dean, then-counsel to
the President and a former Deputy Associate Attorney General, arrived
late to this meeting. When he saw the kinds of things that Liddy was
EMERY, supra note 10 at, 4.
JOHN W. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITEHOUSE YEARS 76 (1976).
87 Robert D. McFadden, G. Gordon Liddy, Mastermind Behind Watergate Burglary,
Dies at 90, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/g-gordonliddy-.dead.html?action=click&module=Well&pgtype=Homepage&section=Obituaries.
88 EMERY, supra note 10, at 89–91.
89 Id. at 91.
90 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, supra
note 46, at 1610.
91 EMERY, supra note 10, at 91.
92 Id. at 92–93.
93 Id. at 93.
85
86
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proposing, Dean suggested that perhaps such discussions should not
occur in the office of the Attorney General, and the meeting soon
adjourned.94
There was a third meeting about Gemstone in March, after Mitchell
had left the Department of Justice.95 Part of Operation Gemstone, even
in its reduced form, was the bugging of the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters at the Watergate complex in Washington,
D.C.96 John Mitchell always publicly denied that he approved the
Watergate break-in, but the evidence that he approved it is very
strong.97 According to Dean, Mitchell privately admitted that he had
approved the plan.98 With the approval and budget he needed, Liddy got
to work. He enlisted the assistance of E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA
official who had been part of the Dr. Fielding break-in99 and who had
been employed by the White House working for Charles Olson,
Counselor to the President.100 Hunt recruited four men to conduct the
burglary.101 Liddy hired James McCord, who was in charge of security
for CREEP, to provide the “bugging expertise” to the entry team.102 The
decision to use Hunt, who had ties to the White House, and McCord,
with his connection to CREEP, were dreadful mistakes for Liddy. The
ties between Hunt and McCord to the White House and CREEP
respectively were easily traceable.
When the Watergate burglars were discovered in the offices of the
Democratic National Committee in the early morning hours of June 17,
1972, they were apprehended by D.C. police.103 McCord’s connection to
CREEP was discovered quickly.104 Hunt’s involvement also surfaced
DEAN, supra note 86, at 85–86 .
EMERY, supra note 10, at 101.
96 Id. at 103.
97 Id.
98 DEAN, supra note 86, at 224.
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almost immediately. One of the burglars carried an address book with
Hunt’s White House phone number in it.105 Inexplicably, Hunt left an
envelope in the room from which he and Liddy were observing the
burglary. The envelope was addressed to his country club and enclosed
his personal check for his dues.106 Hunt and Liddy left behind other
evidence that could be easily traced.107
Because of the politically sensitive nature of the location of the
arrests, D.C. Police alerted the Justice Department, and word quickly
reached Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Criminal Division.108 Petersen had been at the Department of
Justice for twenty-five years, steadily working his way up the career
ladder.109 He had become the first career Department of Justice
prosecutor to be directly appointed to head the Criminal Division.110 In
that capacity, Petersen reported directly to Mitchell’s successor as
Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst. Petersen realized that there
could be “immense political repercussions” from the Watergate
burglary, and he immediately called Kleindienst and reported the
Watergate arrests.111
Kleindienst had been a politically active lawyer in Arizona before
being appointed as Deputy Attorney General by Nixon in 1969.112 When
the Watergate burglars were arrested, Kleindienst had just emerged
from a bruising confirmation process that focused in part on allegations
that President Nixon had pressured Kleindienst, when Kleindienst was
Deputy Attorney General, to drop an antitrust case against the
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (“ITT”) for political
reasons.113 Kleindienst testified falsely during his confirmation
hearings that there had been no such pressure, and that testimony
105 Howard Hunt, Agent Who Organized Botched Watergate Break-in, Dies at 88,
supra note 101.
106 CARL BERNSTEIN AND BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 23 (1974).
107 EMERY, supra note 10, at 136.
108 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, supra
note 46, at 3611.
109 Id.
110 Henry E. Petersen (1972–1974), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/history/assistantattorneys-general/henry-e-peterson (last visited May 24, 2021).
111 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, supra
note 46, at 3611.
112 RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST, JUSTICE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD
KLEINDIENST 13–38 (1985).
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would come back to haunt him later.114 As of June 17, 1972, when the
Watergate burglars were arrested, Kleindienst had been Attorney
General for five days.115
That day, Kleindienst was having lunch after a round of golf at the
Burning Tree Club in Bethesda, Maryland.116 To his surprise, he looked
up and noticed Gordon Liddy standing near the entrance to the locker
room and motioning that he needed to talk. Kleindienst knew Liddy
slightly and did not have a high opinion of him. Kleindienst could not
imagine why Liddy was trying so hard to get his attention at his
country club. Liddy informed Kleindienst that some of the men who had
been arrested the night before at the offices of the Democratic National
Committee might be employees of the White House or CREEP and that
John Mitchell wanted Kleindienst to get them out of jail at once.117 To
his credit, Kleindienst emphatically (indeed, profanely) refused Liddy’s
request.118
It took little time for President Nixon and his senior aides to
appreciate the political danger that the Watergate arrests could present
in an election year.119 The risks were both direct and indirect. The
Watergate operation was a crime perpetrated by employees of CREEP
(Liddy and McCord), and it included a former White House employee
(Hunt). But the President’s advisers had more to worry about than just
the burglary. There were also realistic fears that a thorough
investigation would uncover other illicit activities, including the
burglary of Dr. Fielding’s office and a set of so-called campaign “dirty
tricks” that might constitute violations of statutes regulating campaign
conduct. Many of these “dirty tricks” had been carried out under the
direction of Donald Segretti, who had connections to members of the
White House staff.120
Because of these risks, the cover-up began, with the intent to
contain the damage and protect the President’s reelection. John Dean
Id.
EMERY, supra note 10, at 146.
116 Kleindienst described this event in his testimony before the Senate Watergate
Committee. Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,
supra note 46, at 3560–62.
117 KLEINDIENST, supra note 112, at 146; EMERY, supra note 10, at 146–47.
118 EMERY, supra note 10, at 146–47.
119 Nixon met with his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, and discussed the implications of
the Watergate arrests no later than June 20, 1972, although the recording of that
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120 Id. at 96.
114
115

2021

LEVI AND BELL

755

became the de facto coordinator of the cover-up—the self-described
“ringmaster.”121 One of his first acts was to meet with Petersen and
Kleindienst in the Attorney General’s office. When Kleindienst stepped
out of the meeting, Dean told Petersen, “I don’t believe the White House
can stand a wide-open investigation.”122 Dean explained that the
investigation should be limited to the break-in to ensure that the FBI
did not “stumble into” other matters, including the Fielding burglary
and campaign act violations.123 Petersen’s response was to tell Dean
that there would be “no fishing expedition as far as White House
activities in this investigation.”124 Petersen instructed the prosecutors
in charge of the case, Earl Silbert and Seymour Glanzer, that they were
investigating a break-in and that they were not to wander off into other
things.125 Dean reported back to the White House that he and Petersen
had a deal.126
Another of Dean’s early steps was to take possession of the contents
of Hunt’s White House safe.127 There was evidence in the safe that was
sufficiently “politically sensitive” that John Ehrlichman, one of
President Nixon’s two most senior advisors (the other was Bob
Haldeman), instructed Dean to shred the documents and “deep-six” a
briefcase that was found there.128 The evidence included documents
that could lead to discovery of Hunt’s involvement in the Ellsburg
break-in and forged State Department cables that purported to show
that President Kennedy had ordered the assassination of the President
of South Vietnam.129 Dean delivered at least most of the contents of the
safe to the Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, and eventually
shredded some of the documents himself.130 Months later, Gray secretly
destroyed everything that Dean had given him.131

DEAN, supra note 86, at 185.
Don Fulsome, Nixon’s Watergate Mole, Crime Magazine (July 30, 2012),
http://www.crimemagazine.com/nixon’s-watergate-mole.
123 GORMLEY, supra note 13 at 259.
124 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, supra
note 46, at 3614.
125 Fulsome, supra note 122.
126 GORMLEY, supra note 13, at 259.
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As the investigation and prosecution of the Watergate cases
proceeded, Petersen engaged in numerous other activities that
demonstrated that the Department of Justice was not handling these
cases the same way it would have treated cases that were of no concern
to the President. Petersen kept Dean “totally aware of the activities of
the federal prosecutors,”132 and Dean reported back to Haldeman and
Ehrlichman.133 Silbert and Glanzer did not know that Petersen was
reporting to Dean.134 Dean was allowed to sit in on the FBI interviews
of White House personnel and received investigative reports.135
Petersen allowed several high-ranking officials to testify in his
Department of Justice conference room rather than to the grand jury
directly.136 When John Mitchell testified, Petersen let Dean know what
questions Mitchell should expect.137 When Segretti testified before the
grand jury, Petersen instructed Silbert not to ask about “dirty tricks” or
about who at the White House had hired Segretti.138 In a conversation
that Nixon taped, Dean reported that because of Petersen he (Dean)
“was totally aware of what the grand jury was doing. I knew what
witnesses were going to be called. I knew what they were asked, and I
had to.”139 Archibald Cox later said to the same effect that “the White
House knew what the grand jury testimony was going to be on any day
before the grand jury knew it.”140
For this and his activities later in the process, Petersen was
described as being “pathetically compliant with the wishes of a criminal
President” and of having engaged in “toadyism.”141 Archibald Cox would
later say that Petersen “was sort of overimpressed by what the
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138 Id.
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president wants . . . and the obligation to do it.”142 Reporters in 1974
described the situation this way: “He was sort of awed by Nixon in the
Oval Office . . . the consummate bureaucrat, a civil servant first and
foremost whose deference toward the Presidency left him incapable of
resisting orders that emanated from the White House.”143 Petersen
defended himself but admitted that the Watergate cases put him in
what he perceived to be an extremely difficult situation. He later asked
rhetorically, “What was I supposed to do? Walk into the Oval Office, tell
the President to put his hands up and lean face forward against the
wall?”144 Petersen also indignantly told a reporter, “I walked through a
minefield and came out clean.”145
The efforts to contain the political damage that might have come
from the Watergate burglary succeeded at first. In September 1972, the
grand jury returned indictments of only the five burglars, Hunt, and
Liddy.146 Despite the limits that Petersen had placed on the
investigation and the assistance Petersen had given Dean, Kleindienst
went on the Dick Cavett talk show and bragged about the extent and
scope of the Watergate investigation.147 The dam held. The President
won a landslide re-election in November 1972.
The cover-up continued into 1973. Liddy and McCord were tried and
convicted in the court of Judge John Sirica.148 The other burglars and
Hunt pled guilty.149 But the cover-up began to unravel. Money for the
burglars had been secretly distributed in the summer of 1972.150 The
demands for money had grown in early 1973 to the extent that on
March 21, 1973, Dean took them directly to Nixon. Dean told the
President that “we have a cancer within[—]close to the presidency,
that’s growing. It’s growing daily. It’s compounding.”151 When Dean told

GORMLEY, supra note 13, at 256.
Osnos & Cohen, supra note 15, at 507.
144 Lynch, Rebuilding Morale at Justice, supra note 16.
145 Osnos & Cohen, supra note 15, at 506.
146
The
Watergate
Files
>
Timeline,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section
=1&page=d (last visited May 24, 2021).
147 Dick Cavett’s Watergate at 8:25–10:50 (2014).
148 Lawrence Meyer, Last Two Guilty in Watergate Plot, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1973),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/0131732.htm.
149 Id.
150 EMERY, supra note 10, at 199–200.
151 Cancer on the Presidency, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/secret-whitehouse-tapes/cancer-on-the-presidency (last visited May 24, 2021).
142
143

758

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

Nixon in that same conversation that it might take a million dollars to
buy silence, the President responded, “. . . you could get the money
fairly easy. … What I mean is, you could get a million dollars. And you
could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten.”152
Meanwhile, days before and unbeknownst to Dean and Nixon, James
McCord had privately delivered a letter to Judge Sirica just before
McCord was to be sentenced.153 The letter stated, among other things,
that there had been “political pressure applied to the defendants to
plead guilty and remain silent” and that “[p]erjury occurred during the
trial of matters highly material to the very structure, orientation, and
impact of the government’s case and to the motivation of an intent of
the defendants.”154 McCord also told the judge that “[o]thers involved in
the Watergate operation were not identified during the trial when they
could have been by those testifying.”155 On March 23, Judge Sirica read
McCord’s letter in open court.156
Events picked up speed in April. Dean began to sense that he was to
be made the scapegoat for the cover-up if it unraveled. He hired an
attorney and began secret discussions with Silbert and Glanzer in an
attempt to make a deal to save himself.157 Dean of course knew that
Petersen was feeding information about the case up the chain of
command at the White House.158 To keep the President from learning
that Dean was cooperating, Dean’s lawyer made a deal with Silbert and
Glanzer that the prosecutors would not inform Petersen about their
discussions with Dean.159 Eventually, however, the information the
prosecutors were learning became too hot for them to handle; Dean
implicated Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman in the planning and
cover-up of the Watergate burglary.160 Jeb Stuart Magruder, CREEP’s
former deputy director, had also begun cooperating .161 The prosecutors
told Dean’s lawyer that they were going to have to break their
agreement and inform Petersen of what Dean and Magruder were
saying.162 On April 14, 1973, they did so.163
Id.
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Petersen immediately arranged for Silbert to go with him to
Kleindienst’s home at 1 A.M.164 For much of the night, Petersen and
Silbert briefed Kleindienst on Dean’s and Magruder’s revelations. At
the news of Mitchell’s involvement, Kleindienst wept.165 Kleindienst
decided that he had to report what he knew directly to the President,
and he did so on Sunday, April 15, 1973.166 Because of Kleindienst’s
close connections to Mitchell, Kleindienst recused himself from further
involvement in the Watergate investigation.167 Within days, he decided
that he should resign as Attorney General.168
Kleindienst’s recusal and later resignation left Petersen in charge of
the Watergate investigation as head of the Criminal Division.169 Over
the next few months, Petersen regularly communicated directly with
Nixon about the progress of the investigation.170 The President gave
directions about the investigation, including one not to investigate the
burglary of Dr. Fielding’s office because that was a “national security
matter. You stay out of that. Your mandate is to investigate
Watergate.”171 Petersen complied.172 Petersen at least twice responded
to Nixon’s questions about whether the prosecutors had information
that implicated the President, and Petersen assured him that they did
not.173 During this time, Nixon floated the ideas of having Petersen
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become White House Counsel or maybe Director of the FBI.174 Nixon
told him, “You’re the advisor to the President now.”175 Accusations
about the impropriety of Petersen’s actions, from his initial agreement
with Dean to limit the scope of the Watergate investigation in 1972
through his almost daily conversations with the President in 1973, are
what led Petersen to feel the need to claim, as we quoted before, that he
was “not a whore.”176
Nixon nominated Elliott Richardson to be his third Attorney
General. As part of his confirmation process, Richardson agreed to
appoint a Special Prosecutor for the Watergate investigation and not to
discharge him except for extraordinary impropriety.177 Such an
appointment is in a sense the ultimate sign that a prosecution is, or is
likely to be, so politicized that the Department of Justice cannot handle
it in the normal course.178 It is a demoralizing statement that the
Department’s prosecutors are incapable of discharging their
responsibilities or at least that there is enough of an appearance of such
an impairment that a special prosecutor is needed. Petersen deeply
resented the appointment of the special prosecutor. In his testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities (commonly known as the Senate Watergate Committee),
Petersen said:
Now, one of the things, you will excuse me, I have to get something
off my chest. I resent the appointment of a special prosecutor. Damn
it, I think it is a reflection on me and the Department of Justice. We
would have broken that case wide open, and we would have done it in
the most difficult circumstances. And do you know what happened.
That case was snatched out from under us when we had it 90-percent
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complete with a recognition of the Senate of the United States that
we can’t trust those guys down there.179

Nevertheless, Richardson had committed the Department to the
appointment of a Special Prosecutor for Watergate.
Archibald Cox became the Watergate Special Prosecutor on May 25,
1973.180 On July 16, 1973, presidential aide Alexander Butterfield
revealed to the Senate Watergate Committee that President Nixon had
regularly recorded conversations in the Oval Office and elsewhere.181
Cox sought a number of tapes of particular conversations that he
believed were relevant to the Watergate investigation.182 Nixon
resisted. When Cox refused to back down, Nixon ordered Richardson to
fire Cox. Richardson refused and resigned instead. Richardson’s Deputy
Attorney General, William Ruckelshaus, also refused to fire Cox and
resigned. Robert Bork, who was next-in-line at the Department of
Justice as Solicitor General, ultimately agreed to fire Cox. These were
the events of the so-called “Saturday Night Massacre.”183 FBI agents
were dispatched to secure the offices of the Special Prosecutor. The plan
was to disband the Special Prosecutor’s Office and bring its work back
under the direction of Henry Petersen.184
The public backlash from the Saturday Night Massacre was so great
that within weeks Nixon had to agree to the appointment of another
Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski.185 The investigation and prosecution
of crimes related to Watergate then continued. Meanwhile, Nixon had
nominated Senator William Saxbe as his fourth Attorney General, to
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180 GORMLEY, supra note 13, at 235. Petersen reacted to the suggestion of Cox as
Special Prosecutor with the comment: “[w]ould not recommend.” This came at a time
when “the Criminal Division . . . had recently come under attack for its lack of objectivity
and collusion with the White House . . . .” Id.
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338–77.
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replace Richardson, and Saxbe was confirmed and took office on
January 19, 1974.186
However, the troubles for the President and his Attorneys General
continued. On March 1, 1974, Mitchell was indicted (along with
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, and others) for conspiracy, obstruction
of justice, and perjury in connection with the Watergate cover-up.187
The grand jury named Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.188
Kleindienst had troubles of his own and cut a deal with the Special
Prosecutor. In 1973, Kleindienst had approached Cox’s team and offered
to provide information about the President and ITT.189 As part of these
discussions, Kleindienst revealed that President Nixon had called him
and ordered him to drop the government’s appeal in the ITT antitrust
case.190 Nixon also ordered Kleindienst to fire the Assistant Attorney
General for the Antitrust Division.191 To his credit, Kleindienst did not
follow the orders of the President—an instance in which the Nixon
Justice Department resisted politicization of its work. But Kleindienst
testified falsely to Congress about these events during his confirmation
hearing to become Attorney General. He denied that anyone from the
White House had made any suggestions about what the Justice
Department should do in the ITT case.192 Kleindienst and Jaworski
reached a deal under which Kleindienst tearfully pled guilty on May 16,
1974 to one misdemeanor count of lying to Congress.193 Kleindienst was
fined but did not serve time in prison.194
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As the months proceeded, pressure from the various Watergate
investigations continued to build. The Judiciary Committee of the
House of Representatives approved three articles of impeachment in
July.195 A vote in the House on impeachment and then a trial in the
Senate would have been the next steps on Capitol Hill. Nixon clung to
the hope that he could survive the impeachment process.
In the summer of 1974, the Supreme Court ruled against Nixon’s
attempt to protect his incriminating tapes on the basis of executive
privilege.196 When the recordings were turned over, they showed
Nixon’s involvement in the cover-up within days of the Watergate
burglary.197 Nixon’s political support collapsed, and he resigned on
August 9, 1974.198 Gerald Ford took the oath of office as President that
day.199
Ford inherited a deeply wounded Justice Department. Mitchell was
under indictment and would be convicted of numerous crimes a few
months later. Kleindienst had pled guilty to lying to Congress. The
Watergate cases had been removed from the Department amid concerns
that the Department had been allowing political considerations to affect
its work. In fact, Petersen had limited the scope of the investigation and
then regularly reported to Nixon and Dean on its progress. Richardson
had resigned along with his deputy because Nixon had ordered them to
fire the Special Prosecutor. No wonder that Ford wrote in his memoirs
that “nowhere did Watergate leave more lasting scars than at the
Department of Justice.200
Saxbe was not the answer. He had his own troubles as Attorney
General. After Levi’s nomination, Saxbe would be described as an
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amiable primitive.201 Saxbe had a well-deserved reputation for
bluntness.202 This tendency did not serve him well as Attorney General.
Early in his tenure, the heiress Patricia Hearst was arrested because of
her participation in crimes committed with members of the Symbionese
Liberation Army. Before Hearst could even be charged, Saxbe caused a
furor by describing her as a “common criminal.”203 After that
experience, he found that he had to resist his natural tendency to be
frank. He nevertheless liked being Attorney General and intended to
remain as long as the President would have him. As late as November
17, 1974, Saxbe told a national television audience that he had no
intention of quitting his job as Attorney General, that he intended to
“stick with it.”204
Ford had other plans, and he seized an opportunity to replace Saxbe
without appearing to fire him. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was serving as
the Ambassador to India, but he needed to return to Harvard by
February 1975 to retain his tenure.205 Saxbe had traveled numerous
times to India and was known to be interested in that country.206
Although Ford told the story slightly differently in his memoirs—he
made it sound as if the decision was up to Saxbe207—the President used
the opening to clear the way for a new Attorney General. Saxbe would
be nominated to replace Moynihan in India, and that would open up the
Attorney General’s position in the cabinet.208 As of December 1974,
Saxbe, the last of Nixon’s Attorneys General, was on his way out.209

Lewis, supra note 141, at 15.
Saxbe once said on Face the Nation that the people in the Nixon Administration
were so inept that they ought to be wearing clown suits. Transcript at 14, Oct. 6, 1974,
folder: Face the Nation—Oct. 6, 1974, box 63, Ronald H. Nessen Papers, Gerald Ford
Library.
203 Newspaper clipping from Ann Arbor News (Saxbe to Get Ambassadorship, Reports
Say), Dec. 12, 1974, folder: vertical file, William Saxbe Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
204 Transcript, Nov. 17, 1974, folder: Meet the Press Nov. 17, 1974, box 69, Ronald H.
Nessen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
205 Newspaper clipping from Ann Arbor News (Everybody Happy with Saxbe Xhange),
Dec. 14, 1974, folder: Vertical File, William Saxbe Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
206 Newspaper clipping from Detroit Free Press (Senate Unanimous in OK of Saxbe)
Dec. 20, 1974, folder: Vertical File, William Saxbe Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
207 FORD, supra note 200, at 235–36.
208 Id. at 236.
209 Id. at 240.
201
202
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IV. THE APPOINTMENT OF EDWARD LEVI AND THE BOSTON BUSING CASE
A. The Appointment of Ed Levi as Attorney General
Ford wanted his new Attorney General to be non-political and to
possess a superior intellect.210 Levi’s name was suggested to the White
House by Donald Rumsfeld, then-Chief of Staff to the President.211
Philip Buchen, President Ford’s White House Counsel, undertook to
make some telephone calls about Levi.212 Once those checks had been
made, and the positive comments of those Buchen spoke with had been
noted, Rumsfeld called Levi in early December and asked Levi to come
to the White House.213 Levi came on December 5, before the President
had spoken to Saxbe about leaving the Department of Justice.214
Rumsfeld took Levi to meet with the President, and, in response to a
question from the President, Levi told the President that next Attorney
General should be non-political.215 That was exactly what the President
had said he was looking for. The President, who had never met Levi but
who had been thoroughly briefed about him, “sprang [his] trap” and
offered the Attorney General’s job to Levi on the spot.216 Levi resisted at
first because he was in a major fund drive for the University.217 This is
the point at which Levi felt that he needed the job as Attorney General
like he needed “a hole in the head.”218 According to the President,
however, Levi agreed to serve after Ford appealed to his patriotism.219
Levi’s confirmation process got off to a rocky start, in part because
the White House neglected to consult several powerful senators before
making the announcement.220 But President Ford overcame that

Id. at 236.
Id.
212 Notes on individuals being considered for attorney general, supra note 19.
213 Interview with Edward H. Levi (Document Title: 95-NLF-032), Nov. 1, 1989, folder:
Kramer, Victor H., box 1, Composite Oral History Accessions, Gerald R. Ford Library.
214 David Hess, Saxbe Not Happy About Leaving Job, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 14,
1974) (on file with authors).
215 Gerald R. Ford, In Memoriam: Edward H. Levi (1912–2000), 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 967,
976 (2000).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 JAMES CANNON, GERALD FORD: AN HONORABLE LIFE 308 (2013).
219 Ford, supra note 200, at 976.
220 Newspaper clipping (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, The Opposition Lines Up
Against Levi), Dec. 23, 1974, folder: Justice–Personnel–Attorney General (1), box 24,
Philip Buchen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
210
211
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opposition,221 and Levi’s nomination hearing proceeded in late January
1975.222 The Judiciary Committee approved the nomination, and the
Senate confirmed Levi as Attorney General on February 5, 1975.223 Levi
took office with a promise from the President that the President would
not interfere with Levi’s decisions about particular cases.224 Levi later
said that he did not believe the President would keep this promise, but
in fact the President never did interfere.225 Levi, as we have noted,
made a commitment to the Senate to be independent and to call them
as he saw them. He promised at his swearing-in to lead a non-partisan
Department of Justice.226 The President’s promise, and Levi’s
commitments, were sorely tested when the time came to decide whether
the United States would inject itself into one of the most controversial
issues of the day—school busing for purposes of desegregation—in cases
involving the most volatile of locales—the city of Boston.

221 Newspaper clipping (Orr Kelly, Opposition to Levi Fades), Jan. 19, 1975, folder:
Justice–Personnel–Attorney General (1), box 24, Philip Buchen Papers, Gerald R. Ford
Library.
222 In preparing to testify, Levi was assisted by a young Justice Department lawyer
from Kentucky named Mitch McConnell. Memorandum, McConnell to Levi, Jan. 22, 1975,
folder: Levi, Edward (2), box 9, William T. Kendall Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
223 Gerald R. Ford, Attorney General Edward H. Levi, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 284, 285
(1985).
224 The Office of the Attorney General, supra note 37, at 51:50.
225 Id. The President’s position was not merely a private promise made to Levi. At
Levi’s swearing in, Ford’s prepared remarks included this paragraph:
In looking for a new Attorney General, I determined that a traditional political
appointment would not do. Recent events had raised widespread doubt about
our justice system in general and our Department of Justice in particular. The
Department of Justice has been and must remain a strong arm of the executive
branch. The Justice Department must participate in the development of
administration policies. But it must not be involved in partisan politics.
Remarks at 4, Feb. 7, 1975, folder: Feb. 7, 1975 Remarks for Swearing-In Ceremony of
Edward Levi, Attorney-General, box 5, Reading Copies of Presidential Speeches and
Statements, Gerald R. Ford Library.
226 At the ceremony, Levi said:
We have lived in a time of change and corrosive skepticism and cynicism
concerning the administration of justice. Nothing can more weaken the quality
of life or imperil the realization of those goals we all hold dear than our failures
to make clear by word and deed that our law is not an instrument of partisan
purpose, and it is not an instrument to be used in ways which are careless of
the higher values which are within all of us.
Exchange of Remarks, Feb. 7, 1975, folder: FG 17/a 8/9/74–2/10/75, box 88, White
House Central Files Subject File, Gerald R. Ford Library.
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B. The Boston Busing Case
The example we have chosen to illustrate Edward Levi’s
non-political approach to his job as Attorney General is the decision he
made on Saturday, May 29, 1976, not to have the Department of Justice
file a memorandum with the Supreme Court about what had become
known as the “Boston Busing” case. Levi awoke early that day, and he
had not yet decided whether the Department of Justice should get
involved, essentially on the side of the parties who were opposed to a
district judge’s order to bus school children to promote desegregation of
public schools.227 The Department of Justice memorandum was drafted
and ready to go, and Levi had two press releases in his briefcase, one
announcing that the Department of Justice would be filing the
memorandum and another announcing that it would not.228 Sometime
between 5 A.M. and 8 A.M. on that Saturday morning, Levi made his
decision.229
To understand why this decision was complex and controversial, and
why it raised issues of partisan influences on the Department of
Justice, we have to look back at the political environment in which Levi
was operating. Twenty years had passed since the first decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,230 and school desegregation was still one
of the hottest political issues of the day.231 In particular, the use of what
opponents called “forced busing” as a remedy for discrimination was a
highly sensitive issue. All over the country—in Michigan, Delaware,
Texas, California, and many other places—there was controversy and
unrest where black students were bused across town to attend formerly
all-white schools, and where white students were bused across town to
attend formerly all-black schools.
Nowhere was the issue more volatile than in Boston.232 Based upon
a history of deliberate segregation of the Boston city schools, United
Notes of interview of Levi by Reichley, supra note 68, at 3.
Draft press releases and draft memorandum, folder 2: Boston School Busing cases
(1975), notes, 1991, box 124, May, 1976, Edward H. Levi Papers, University of Chicago
Library, Department of Special Collections.
229 Id.
230 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231 For general background on the history of busing for the purpose of desegregating
public schools, see MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
NATIONAL RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2016).
232 For a retrospective look at busing in Boston, see the two-part series produced by
WBUR. The first part: Bruce Gellerman, ‘It Was Like a War Zone’: Busing in Boston,
wbur (Sep. 5, 2014, 8:35 AM) (available at https://www.wbur.org/news/2014/09/05/boston227
228
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States District Judge Arthur Garrity in 1974 ordered the busing of
white students from South Boston to Roxbury, Massachusetts, and the
busing of black students from Roxbury to South Boston.233 The order led
to violence and prompted numerous demonstrations.234 One photo of an
anti-busing rally shows a sea of white faces and a demonstrator holding
a placard that read, “WHITES HAVE RIGHTS.”235 A woman in the
foreground of the picture is wearing a button that says, “NO WE
WON’T GO.”236 Many of the protests were organized by an anti-busing
organization, Restore Our Alienated Rights—known by its initials as
“ROAR”—led by Louise Day Hicks.237 The logo for ROAR was a drawing
of a lion mid-roar with its front paws resting on a school bus.238
Supporters of the judge’s order also demonstrated. One march was led
by a banner that read: “DESEGREGATE BOSTON SCHOOLS NOW”
and “KEEP THE BUSES ROLLING.”239
President Ford became President less than two months after Judge
Garrity issued his initial busing order. On principle, Ford opposed
busing.240 In a move that was unprecedented at the time, the President
commented directly on his disagreement with Judge Garrity’s decision
at a press conference on October 9, 1974. Ford said, “the court decision
busing-anniversary).
The
second
part:
Bruce
Gellerman,
Busing
Left
Deep Scars on Boston, Its Students, wbur (Sep. 5, 2014, 10:05 AM)
(available at
https://www.wbur.org/news/2014/09/05/boston-busing-effects).
233 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
935 (1976).
234 In one incident, hundreds of white students walked out of school the day after the
stabbing of a white student by a black student had led a crowd of about 1,000 white
students to trap 131 black students inside a school building for four hours. John Kifner, 4
Boston High Schools Hit by Walkouts, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1974,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1974/12/13/79883650.pdf?pdf_redirect=t
rue&ip=0.
235 The photo is reprinted in Nikole Hannah-Jones, It Was Never About Busing, N. Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/sunday/it-was-neverabout-busing.html.
236 Id.
237 For general background on ROAR, see Rachel Sherman, ROAR: The Anti-Busing
Group with the Loudest Voice, https://bosdesca.omeka.net/exhibits/show/roar-anti-businggroup (last visited May 24, 2021).
238 Id.
239 The photograph is reproduced in Desegregation Busing, Encyclopedia of Boston,
https://bostonresearchcenter.org/projects_files/eob/single-entry-busing.html (last visited
May 24, 2021).
240 Interview by James Reichley of Philip Buchen 3–4, Sept. 1, 1977, folder: Ford White
House, box 1, A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts, Gerald R. Ford Library.
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in that case, in my judgment, was not the best solution to quality
education in Boston.”241 It should be noted that Ford also called for
calm.242
The Boston busing case began to make its way through the court
system, as did the busing cases in other parts of the country. Over a
year later, on November 20, 1975, the President met with Levi to
discuss busing. President Ford’s Press Secretary, Ron Nessen, later
described the meeting: “The President asked the Attorney General to
look for an appropriate and proper case to ask the Court to re-examine
busing as a remedy, and to explore alternative solutions that would be
less destructive[] of the fabric of our community life.”243 It was, Nessen
said, “a policy directive” from the President.244 Levi agreed with the
policy.245 Both Ford and Levi understood that the decision would belong
to Levi and that the President would not be getting involved in Levi’s
decisions about individual cases.246
By early 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had approved Judge Garrity’s orders in the Boston case. Several
petitions for certiorari were on their way to the Supreme Court as
interested parties sought to have the court end or limit busing in
Boston.
Meanwhile, President Ford was locked in a battle with Ronald
Reagan for the Republican nomination for President. This was a
bitterly contested and close contest.247 It would have been to the
President’s political advantage to be seen as acting forcefully in
opposition to busing. A report of Reagan’s assertions about busing in a
speech in Sacramento illustrates how Reagan treated the issue during
the campaign. Reagan said that if he were elected he would call on

241
Anthony Ripley, Violence is Deplored, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/10/archives/violence-is-deplored.html.
242 Id.
243 Lesley Oelsner, President Seeks Case for Review of Busing Issue, N. Y. TIMES (May
19, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/19/archives/president-seeks-case-for-reviewof-busing-issue-nessen-says-ford.html.
244 Id.
245 Interview by James Reichley of Philip Buchen, supra note 240.
246 Interview by James Reichley with Gerald Ford, Mar. 3, 1978, folder: Ford White
House, Ford, Gerald, box 1, A. James Reichley Interview Transcripts, Gerald R. Ford
Library.
247 President Ford devoted a lengthy chapter in his memoir to Reagan’s “[c]hallenge
from the [r]ight.” FORD, supra note 200, at 333–407.
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Congress to outlaw “forced busing.”248 Reagan claimed that “[f]ederal
intervention in the classroom was responsible for much of the nation's
educational deficiencies and he promised that if elected President, he
would issue instructions to Federal departments ‘to get off the back’ of
local school boards.”249 Reagan also “called busing for purposes of
desegregation a ‘pernicious’ instrument of the Federal courts.”250
Even before the possibility of having the Department of Justice get
involved in the Boston case came up, Levi was being criticized for being
a political liability for President Ford in the race for the Republican
nomination for President. Levi’s nuanced pronouncements on crime
control did not dovetail with the President’s much more forceful
statements on the campaign trail. The Wall Street Journal reported,
“Polls show that crime could be one of the [most] explosive political
issues of the campaign year, and Mr. Levi is neither explosive nor
political.”251
Then Levi received a call about the pending petitions for certiorari
in the Boston case from Robert Bork, his former student and now the
Solicitor General of the United States.252 Bork said, “I want you to know
that I am thinking about whether or not we should file a Memorandum
in support of at least one of the petitions; Do you want to discuss it?”253
Levi later said that the politics of the matter immediately went through
his head and that he thought he could have avoided the issue if he
chose to do so.254
Levi was not naïve. If he decided to go ahead, he would be accused of
using the Department to further the political position of the President.
If he didn’t, he could be seen as hurting the President politically with
respect to a subject about which the President felt strongly, about which
he had rightfully set his broad policy goals, and about which the
248 John Nordhelmer, Reagan Criticizes U.S. School Role, N. Y. TIMES (June 3, 1976),
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/06/03/archives/reagan-criticizes-us-school-role-makescampaign-vow-to-get-federal.html.
249 Id.
250 Id. The Ford campaign was closely monitoring Reagan’s comments. A report about
the Sacramento speech appears in the papers of Ron Nessen, Ford’s Press Secretary.
Memorandum, June 1976, folder: Reagan Issues Busing, box 39, Ronald Nessen Papers,
Gerald R. Ford Library.
251 Mitchell C. Lynch, Levi Takes Politics Out of Justice Agency, But Is He a Ford
Asset?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 1976) (on file with authors).
252 Press Conference of The Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the United
States with Members of the Press 5 (June 16, 1976, 10:00 A.M.) at 5 (on file with authors)
(photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library).
253 Id.
254 Id. at 13.
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President would be subject to criticism from Reagan. Levi thought that
his relationship with Bork was such that he could have said, “Bob,
forget it. Why are you going to cause trouble?”255
But Levi did not succumb to that understandable temptation to stay
away from such a hot political issue. He later said, “[b]ut I really made
the rather immediate judgment—and I think it was the right one—that
I have responsibilities, official responsibilities, and I don’t think they
can be put in the icebox because this is a political year.”256 Levi told
Bork that he thought they should review the possibility of Department
of Justice involvement in the Boston case, and he got Bork together
with the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Stanley Pottinger,
to discuss the matter.257 The result of those discussions was that Levi
thought the best way to proceed was to draft the memorandum and see
what it looked like.258 He said, “the only way . . . that you find out
whether something can be written is that you try to write it and after
you write it you see where there are holes in it and whether it doesn’t
work.”259 The lawyers in the Department went through this process and
eventually created six different drafts as they learned more and more
about what was in the voluminous record developed in the trial court.260
Levi had not made a decision, but obviously he was seriously
considering filing a memorandum with the Supreme Court in support of
one or more of the petitions for certiorari. At this point, no one at the
Department of Justice told the President or White House counsel what
was going on.
Then all hell broke loose.
Someone made the Department of Justice deliberations public, and
the New York Times published the story on May 14, 1976.261 The Times
story noted right away the possible connection to “President Ford’s
struggle to win the Republican Presidential nomination over the
conservative challenge of former Gov. Ronald Reagan of California.”262
The story later mentioned the “connection that many persons might

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 13–14.
257 Id. at 6.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 6–7.
260 Id. at 8.
261 Lesley Oelsner, Levi Weighs Asking High Court to Upset Boston Busing Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/15/archives/new-jerseypages-levi-weighs-asking-high-court-to-upset-boston.html.
262 Id.
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256
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draw between the filing of the brief and the Presidential race.”263 The
story also noted that the timing of the Department’s potential filing was
highly suspicious. Bork had urged that the Department file the brief on
May 14, just before the Republican primary on May 18 in Michigan,
which had had its own severe busing problems.264 Levi professed not to
know or care who was the source of the leak, but he was very
disappointed because, he said with understatement, “the political
aspects became more pronounced.”265
Now that the Department’s deliberations were public, interested
parties wanted to lobby Levi. On May 18, four days after the New York
Times published its first article on the matter, Levi started his day with
a phone call with Philip Buchen, White House Counsel, about the
Boston busing situation.266 Then Levi met at the Justice Department
with Louise Hicks, the founder of ROAR—the group organized to resist
the Boston busing order.267 Ms. Hicks, of course, wanted the
Department of Justice to get involved to try to overturn Judge Garrity’s
orders. An hour later, Levi met with Roy Wilkins, the Executive
Director of the NAACP, and Clarence Mitchell, the chief lobbyist for the
NAACP.268 They brought with them the lead lawyers in the Boston case
and tried to persuade Levi to stay out of the Boston case.269 Levi rather
laconically described it this way: “we had the added point that a lot of
people wanted to talk to us. Now, that had a certain value, I think. In
any event, various groups came in and we heard them out, and I was
told a great deal about the situation in Boston.”270 The New York Times
described Levi’s apparent approach to the meetings: “Mr. Levi,
according to persons who attended each meeting, said very little to
either group and sought to convey the impression that he wanted to
hear both sides before making his final decision.”271
May 18 was not the only day of lobbying. Over the next eleven days,
Levi met or talked with (among others) Senators Brooke, Roth, Biden,

Id.
Id.
265 Press Conference of The Honorable Edward H. Levi, supra note 252, at 14.
266 Attorney General’s Log, May 18, 1976, folder 7, box 110, Edward H. Levi Papers,
University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Press Conference of The Honorable Edward H. Levi, supra note 252, at 9.
271 Oelsner, supra note 261.
263
264

2021

LEVI AND BELL

773

and the Congressional Black Caucus.272 Levi had several passionate
exchanges with the Secretary of Transportation, William Coleman, the
only black member of President Ford’s Cabinet, who urged Levi to stay
out of the Boston case.273 Levi also had several phone calls with Buchen
about the Boston case, and Levi met twice at the White House with
President Ford about busing. They met for about an hour each time, on
May 21 and again on Friday, May 28—the day before Levi made his
decision.274 Levi reported that he and the President had “excellent
discussions” about the factors that Levi was considering.275
These meetings and phone calls, and the attendant publicity, now
added new political dimensions to the decision. All Levi wanted to do
was decide whether the Boston case was a good case to help the
Supreme Court develop the precise contours of the law, to narrow the
circumstances under which busing would be the appropriate remedy.
Now, however, if the Department of Justice filed, it would appear to be
siding with ROAR and other opponents of the judge’s order. If the
Department did not file, it would be seen as caving in to the pressure of
Senator Brooke, the NAACP, and other proponents of busing. Levi had
a political hot potato in his hands. Levi was understandably concerned
“that if he decided not to intervene in the Boston case, it might seem
that he was reacting to public pressure.”276
So that takes us back to 5 A.M. on Saturday morning, May 29. Levi
decided that the Department would not file a memorandum in the
Boston case, spoke with White House Counsel Buchen, and instructed
272 These various meetings and phone calls appear on the Attorney General’s logs for
May 19, May 20, May 24, May 25, May 27, and May 28, 1976, folder 7, box 110, Edward
H. Levi Papers, University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections.
273 Eight days before Levi made his decision in the Boston case, Secretary Coleman
delivered remarks to the American Law Institute that included this:
I don’t always agree with everything Ed Levi does. Indeed, and I report this
publicly because it is already public knowledge, I have been urging him during
these last several days not to add to our inventory of disagreements by taking a
position in the Boston school litigation which in my respectful view would be
ill-timed and unsound in law.

Memorandum, Buchen to Lynn and Gergen, May 25, 1976, file: Justice-General (6),
box 23, Philip Buchen Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
274 These calls and meetings appear on the Attorney General’s logs for May 21 and
May 28, 1976, folder 7, box 110, Edward H. Levi Papers, University of Chicago Library,
Department of Special Collections.
275 Press Conference of The Honorable Edward H. Levi, supra note 252, at 10.
276 Lesley Oelsner, Levi, In Reversal, Won’t Use Boston as Test on Busing, N.Y. TIMES
(May 30, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/30/archives/levi-in-reversal-wont-useboston-as-test-on-busing-decision-not-to.html.

774

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

the Public Information Office to issue a press release at 12:15 P.M.277
Levi called Buchen to tell him the decision, and the President learned of
the decision from Buchen.278 Levi went home and left it to Robert Bork
to answer questions from the press.279 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the Boston cases several weeks later.280
Levi described his decision as a matter of judgment. Political
considerations had no role.281 His legal judgment was that Boston was
not the right case in which to try to influence the development of the
law in the direction that Levi and the President agreed was the right
direction. Levi’s comments on the decision included these:
So that on Saturday morning I decided that on balance, using the
best judgment I could—and I have no desire to try to second-guess
myself any more on that subject—that we should not go in . . . What
was involved was basically a question of law, but that oversimplifies
it; because the evolution of opinions and the kind of cases one brings
to the court inevitably involve what you think the facts of the case
really are and as they will be seen by the court, whether it is a case
for the kind of theory which we think and have thought for some time
is correct; but we also of course had to be concerned, as I think the
Department of Justice always has to be, about the—you can’t be
indifferent to the effect on the particular community.
[O]ur concern with respect to Boston was, how much difference that
would make in that particular situation? So that we had to make a
judgment whether it was the right case to bring it out . . . . [W]e
didn’t think it was the right case.282

Levi said later that he had not taken any political considerations into
account when he made the decision, but he knew it was a no-win
situation: “I did my best to remove any other kinds of influences upon
me. I always knew that whatever decision I made would be the wrong
one; that it is the kind of decision which you do not win on.”283

277 Attorney General’s Log, May 29, 1976, folder 7, box 110, Edward H. Levi Papers,
University of Chicago Library, Department of Special Collections.
278 Notes of interview of Levi by Reichley, supra note 68, at 3.
279 Memorandum to file, Mar. 7, 1991, folder 2: Boston School Busing Cases (1975),
notes 1991, box 124, Edward H. Levi Papers, University of Chicago Library, Department
of Special Collections.
280 White, 426 U.S. 935.
281 Notes of interview of Levi by Reichley, supra note 68, at 2.
282 Press Conference of The Honorable Edward H. Levi, supra note 252, at 10–11, 26.
283 Id. at 11.

2021

LEVI AND BELL

775

Some reactions to the decision were critical. The New York Times
speculated about appearances of possible political motivations:
“[a]pparently, however, the Attorney General in making his decision
weighed several factors, both strictly legal ones and others that in a
broad sense at least could be considered political.”284 Columnists
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak criticized Levi’s handling of the
Boston case as “‘hopelessly amateurish.’”285 Levi’s response to that was
that the decision “might [have] . . . seemed bad because it was not
politically shrewd—indeed it was not political,” and so “in that sense
was hopelessly amateurish.”286
Despite the lost political opportunity, the President kept his word to
leave the decision to Levi, and Ford publicly supported Levi’s decision.
On Face the Nation a week later, the President said:
Within the last [two] weeks the Attorney General has decided not to
intervene in the Boston case for good reasons that he, as Attorney
General, decided, and I support him. On the other hand the Attorney
General is seeking a particular case where we can get a clarification
or a modification of some of the previous Supreme Court decisions in
this very complex area.287

The ongoing search for the right case was not the only way in which
Levi continued to serve the President’s policy against busing while
preserving his independence with respect to particular cases. Over the
next few weeks, Levi met with the President numerous times to work
on trying to further the President’s anti-busing policy in other ways,
including through the passage of legislation.288
The Boston busing case is an excellent example of an Attorney
General doing things the right way. Edward Levi had political reasons
to duck the issue entirely. He thought about them—he recognized
them—and then he ignored them. He and other lawyers at the
Department proceeded to analyze the case in order to decide whether it
presented an appropriate opportunity to try to influence the direction of
Oelsner, supra note 276.
Address, Edward H. Levi Before the Annual Dinner Meeting of the Chicago Bar
Association 5, June 24, 1976, Levi Bound Vol. 3, Gerald R. Ford Library.
286 Id.
287 Interview on CBS News’ “Face the Nation,”
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-cbs-news-face-the-nation (last
visited May 24, 2021).
288See,
e.g., Memorandum from Jim Cannon regarding meeting on school
desegregation, June 2, 1976, folder: Justice, Edward H. Levi, box 2, James E. Connor
Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
284
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the law, consistent with the broad policy preferences of the President.
They did so without regard to the politics of the moment. Then, through
no fault of Levi’s, the matter became public in the midst of deliberations
about what to do. That brought forth even more political pressure, from
both sides of a highly volatile issue, in the midst of presidential primary
season. Here, again, Levi could have allowed the politics of the situation
to influence him. He did not. Levi set partisan politics aside and used
his best legal judgment in connection with a highly charged decision.
His conduct in this case is a good lesson for future Attorneys General.
V. THE APPOINTMENT OF GRIFFIN BELL AND THE MARSTON AFFAIR
A. The Appointment of Griffin Bell as Attorney General
When Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the Presidential
Election of 1976, it became clear that there would be a new Attorney
General in a few months. Carter and Bell had known each other since
their boyhoods in Sumter County, Georgia, but they were not close
personally.289 Even before he was elected, Carter asked Bell to be
thinking about who should be appointed as Attorney General.290 Bell
drew up a list, but ultimately, Carter asked Bell to take the job.291 Bell’s
assumption was that Carter wanted someone he knew to be the
Attorney General because of the need for the President to have absolute
confidence in a cabinet official with so much power.292
Bell’s nomination was controversial, and his confirmation hearings
were strident at times. Bell had served as a sort of informal part-time
Chief of Staff to Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver in the late 1950s,
during a time of great turmoil over the desegregation of Georgia
schools.293 Vandiver had been elected on a slogan of “no, not one,” and
Bell’s involvement with Vandiver’s policies on segregation concerned a
number of Senators and witnesses.294 Those concerns were exacerbated
when it became known that Judge Bell belonged to several private clubs

289 Interview by James W. Ceasar et. al. with Griffin Bell 4 (Mar. 23, 1988) (final
edited transcript reprinted in Griffin Bell Oral History, University of Virginia Miller
Center, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/griffin-bell-oralhistory).
290 Id. at 5.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 12–13.
293 The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell, supra note 17, at 93–97.
294 Id. at 92.
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that had only white members.295 Bell chose to resign those
memberships.296 Despite the controversies, Bell ultimately was
confirmed by the Senate and took office on January 26, 1977.
Griffin Bell had never met Edward Levi until after Bell was
nominated to serve as Carter’s Attorney General.297 After Levi called
Bell and offered to brief him on the issues that awaited Bell, they spent
two days together at the Department of Justice in early January
1977.298 Bell understood that his mission was restoring the
independence of the Department of Justice. He knew that the legacy of
Watergate had “given rise to an understandable public concern that
some decisions at Justice may be the products of favor, or pressure, or
politics.”299 He appreciated that his mission involved not only working
to restore the reality of the Department’s independence, but also the
public’s perception of the Department’s independence. Restoring the
reality of independence required putting in place procedures that would
allow the Department’s lawyers the freedom to exercise their
professional judgment absent political influence. Just as important, the
public must have confidence that the Department is independent.300
Griffin Bell’s mantra as Attorney General was that the Department of
Justice be a “neutral zone” in the government, and he was keenly aware
“[i]t follows necessarily that the Department must be recognized by all
citizens as a neutral zone, in which neither favor nor pressure nor
politics is permitted to influence the administration of the law.”301
The episode we have chosen from Griffin Bell’s tenure as Attorney
General squarely raises the issue of restoring both the reality and
perception of the Department’s independence and non-partisanship.
The incident we highlight involved a major controversy that erupted
over what would usually be a routine event: the replacement of a
hold-over Republican United States Attorney by an incoming
Democratic presidential administration. It is initially a tale of missteps
and miscalculations by an Attorney General that damaged the
Id. at 119–121.
Id. at 121.
297 Interview of Griffin Bell by Patrick Longan, June 4, 2003 (notes on file with
authors).
298 Id.
299 Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States, An Address by the Honorable
Griffin B. Bell at the Great Hall, U.S. Department of Justice 3 (Sept. 6, 1978, 11 AM),
transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/0906-1978b.pdf.
300 Id. at 5–6.
301 Id. at 13.
295
296
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perception of the Department’s independence, but ultimately a story of
lessons learned, responsibility taken, and positive leadership during the
sort of adversity and crisis that marks the tenure of every Attorney
General.
B. The Marston Affair
The episode, commonly referred to as the Marston affair,302 was a
fiasco for Bell and the Department. Looking back, Bell said, “We made
grave mistakes from start to finish in handling the matter.”303 Bell
viewed the episode as a serious setback that cost him precious months
in his mission to restore the Department.304 It was not only
embarrassing to Bell himself, but as we shall see, it proved to be
personally embarrassing to President Carter to such a degree that Bell
seriously considered resigning.305 These were Bell’s “darkest days as
attorney general.”306 It is sometimes said that adversity may not build
character, but it does reveal it, and so it was with Bell and the Marston
affair. He took ownership of the problem, forthrightly admitted errors,
and declined to shift blame. His special assistant at the Department of
Justice, Terry Adamson, said that the Marston affair was “a watershed
positive event for Judge Bell during his tenure, earning him critical
credibility for his humility, as well as candor with the press and
public.”307
Every Attorney General faces a constant tension between the mission
of faithfully executing the laws in a neutral manner and the reality that
the Attorney General is a political appointee of a partisan president.308
Some Attorneys General succumb to the temptations of partisan
loyalty. The rest, including Bell, inevitably face situations where
mistakes create the appearance of possible partisanship that is hyped
by the administration’s political foes and by the press. Some Attorneys
General are unable to meet these challenging situations. Others,
including Bell, are able to summon the character and judgment not only
302 William Safire, The Philadelphia Story, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1978, at 10, reprinted
in Nomination of Benjamin R. Civiletti to be Deputy Attorney General, Hearing before the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2 539, 541
(1978) (embracing the “The Marston Affair” as the episode’s appropriate title).
303 BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 208.
304 Id. at 209.
305 Id. at 208.
306 Id.
307 Terry Adamson, Hardworking Bell Leaves a Legacy To Be Appreciated, 18 J. S.
LEGAL HIST. 307, 314 (2010).
308 Meador, supra note 36, at 299.
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to weather such political firestorms but to restore the perception of
independence and neutrality. The Marston affair illustrates Bell’s
ability to do this.309
The narrative of the Marston affair begins by introducing its
protagonist, David W. Marston, who graduated from law school in 1967
at age twenty-five. He began his legal career with a firm in
Philadelphia. Marston had political ambitions but was unsuccessful in
two campaigns for seats in the state legislature. Marston came to the
attention of Republican United States Senator, Richard Schweiker, who
asked Marston to join his staff in 1973.310
In 1976, with the presidential election a few months off, Marston was
appointed United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by President Ford.311 It is unusual for U.S. Attorneys,
who require vetting by the Senate Judiciary Committee and
confirmation by the full Senate, to be nominated and approved so close
to an election, but with the backing of Senator Schweiker, David
Marston found himself as the presidentially-appointed head of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia.312 Marston took office in June 1976,
at age thirty-five and less than ten years after graduating from law
school.313 He had served about five months when Carter defeated
President Ford.314
Having introduced David Marston, there are two other points of
background to set the stage for the Marston affair. First, it is important
to have a sense of the traditional process for handling the appointment
of United States Attorneys when a presidential election results in a
change to a President of a different political party. In 1976, Republican
Gerald R. Ford lost to Jimmy Carter, so the incoming Democratic
Administration would have to make decisions about who would run the
U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the ninety-four federal judicial districts
around the country.

Id.
BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 209.
311 Id. at 208.
312 Id. at 209.
313 Id. It is an interesting political twist that in July 1976, shortly after Marston
became U.S. Attorney, his political sponsor Senator Schweiker was named by Republican
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan as his intended choice for Vice-President in
Reagan’s unsuccessful insurgent campaign against President Ford for the Republican
nomination. See JULES WITCOVER, MARATHON: THE PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENCY 1972–
1976 456–63 (New York, 1977).
314 BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 209.
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The process has varied from one presidential transition to another.
Some of the outgoing party’s U.S. Attorneys will resign of their own
accord during the transition, with an Assistant U.S. Attorney running
the office on an interim basis. After the inauguration, some incoming
administrations will require all incumbent U.S. Attorneys to leave
office, with interim U.S. Attorneys taking over. Other transitions take a
hybrid approach with most U.S. Attorneys asked to leave office, but
some incumbents asked to stay on at least for the time being. The
decision to retain a U.S. Attorney appointed by the opposite party, at
least on a temporary basis, might be based on the perceived merit of the
incumbent or perhaps concern about disrupting the continuity of one or
more sensitive pending investigations or prosecutions.
Every transition is marked by a somewhat chaotic process that
involves ninety-four office-by-office decisions and varying timelines for
selections; vetting (including full field FBI background investigations);
and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings and Senate confirmation
that can extend many months into the new administration. Politics
makes a significant contribution to the chaos. Because the
appointments require Senate confirmation, it is traditional that the
senior Senator of the President’s party will have a role in selecting the
U.S. Attorneys to serve in the federal districts in the state. If there are
two Senators of the President’s party in a state, sometimes—but not
always—the senators will share power. Sometimes—but not always—
the Senator or Senators will set up an advisory committee to make
recommendations. If there is no Senator of the President’s party, then
the members of the House Delegation of the President’s party will
expect input on the nominations, adding to the number of decision
makers and the level of chaos. So, the process for a new presidential
administration deciding how to fill U.S. Attorney positions and actually
filling those positions is, at best, untidy, cumbersome, and time
consuming—completely unlike the snappy precision and efficiency of
the changing of the palace guard.
The second piece of background to set the stage for the Marston
affair concerns Jimmy Carter’s campaign for President. In campaigning
to restore morality to the government after Watergate, candidate
Carter espoused the highest standards of integrity and honesty in
government. For example, candidate Carter said this: “If I ever tell a
lie, if I ever mislead you, if I ever betray a trust or confidence, I want
you to come and take me out of the White House.”315 Such an absolute
315 That Mishandled Marston Affair: Broken promises and misstatements put Carter on
the Spot, TIME, Feb. 6, 1978, at 20.
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standard of moral purity may have been appealing to voters in the wake
of the corruption of Watergate, but once in office, it invites the press
and public to use it as the day-to-day measure of the administration’s
probity, and the ease of committing perceived lapses of such a high
standard may set up the administration for failure, or at least put the
administration in a constant posture of defensiveness. The Carter
campaign thus set standards of behavior in office that invited close
scrutiny.
The Carter campaign also made declarations concerning how a
Carter Administration would select federal prosecutors. The story of
Watergate included significant elements of the compromise of
independent prosecutorial decision-making and politicization of the
Department of Justice. Candidate Carter said this: “All federal judges
and prosecutors should be appointed strictly on the basis of merit
without any consideration of political aspects or influence.”316 Such a
sweeping proposal flew in the face of the traditional political process by
which judges and U.S. Attorneys were selected. No one advocated
appointing unqualified judges and U.S. Attorneys, but the system of
political patronage was entrenched. That is simply the way the system
worked: the party in control of the Executive Branch exercised the
appointment power to favor party loyalists.
This reality was brought home to President-elect Carter and
Attorney General-designate Bell by Senator James Eastland, the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.317 Senator Eastland
made clear that while some form of non-political merit selection might
be possible for federal appellate judges, politicians of the President’s
party would continue to have a role in selecting district judges and U.S.
Attorneys for federal districts in their states.318 The campaign promise
of merit selection without any political considerations was a
non-starter. A Democratic Administration would mean Democratic
appointees would be selected with input from the Democratic political
establishment. Exceptions would be few and far between. That was the
way the system would continue to work.
With that background, we now focus on the Carter administration’s
process of selecting the U.S. Attorneys following the inauguration in
January 1977. During 1977, the new Administration had named about
seventy U.S. Attorneys, all Democrats, and about twenty Republican
U.S. Attorneys were allowed to remain in office at least temporarily.
Id. at 20.
BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 208–09.
318 Id.
316
317
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One of those allowed to stay on was David Marston in Philadelphia.319
Attorney General Bell had criteria that had been applied to the
incumbent U.S. Attorneys thus far evaluated. Under those criteria,
David Marston was unlikely to be retained. Marston was relatively
inexperienced as a lawyer, and very inexperienced as a prosecutor and
trial lawyer. Not only was Marston a Republican political appointee,
but he was a very political political appointee, having come directly
from a Senator’s office with two previous attempts at elective office and
likely having designs on future attempts based on a resume and
reputation burnished by service as the U.S. Attorney.320
Nonetheless, Marston was not immediately replaced. Two of Bell’s
advisors, one of whom had connections to Pennsylvania politics,
recommended that Marston not be removed right away and that he
should be considered for retention. These advisors pointed to the fact
that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia had several important
investigations and prosecutions involving prominent Democratic
politicians and an investigation into abuses by the Philadelphia Police
Department. Removing Marston, who had been effective at portraying
himself in the local media as a corruption-fighting white knight, might
be viewed as interfering with those ongoing cases and might cause a
backlash by the media in Philadelphia. Despite some misgivings, Bell
agreed not to remove Marston immediately.321
Bell may have avoided short-term media backlash, but he
encountered backlash from another quarter. Because Pennsylvania did
not have a Democratic Senator, the Democrats representing
Pennsylvania in the House of Representatives not only wanted their
voices heard—they insisted that their demands be met. Although the
Democratic Congressmen could not agree on who should be U.S.
Attorney in Philadelphia, they agreed on who it shouldn’t be. They
demanded that Marston be removed from office. One of those
Democratic Congressmen was Joshua Eilberg of Philadelphia, who
happened to hold an important position on the House Judiciary
Committee. In meetings and phone calls with Bell, Congressman
Eilberg repeatedly demanded that Marston be removed. The message
having been received, Bell avoided taking Eilberg’s calls.322
After an unsuccessful attempt to recruit a replacement for Marston
and further warnings that removing Marston might be perceived as an
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209. See also Meador, supra note 36, at 298.
321 BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 209–10.
322 Id. at 210–11.
319
320
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attempt to undermine cases he was handling, Attorney General Bell
decided to keep Marston for the balance of 1977 while a search for his
replacement was conducted.323 For his part, Marston was hoping to
keep his job for the rest of President Carter’s four-year term. Marston
remembered candidate Carter’s commitment to merit selection and
intended to make the case that he deserved retention on that basis.324
As U.S. Attorney, Marston presided over some impressive corruption
prosecutions in 1977 and bolstered his case. Of course, Marston
inherited investigations and cases being worked by talented prosecutors
and an excellent contingent of FBI agents, but he was the leader and
the human face of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and received substantial
credit with the media and the public.325 During that first year of the
Carter Administration, Marston was pleased to receive some signals
from Bell’s advisors that he had a chance to hold on to his job.326
Meanwhile, Congressman Eilberg’s frustration grew because
Marston remained in office, his demands were unmet, and Bell would
not return his calls. Then, on November 4, 1977, perhaps the most
significant event in the Marston affair transpired. As part of his
campaign to remove Marston, Congressman Eilberg tried to arrange a
phone call with President Carter himself. Perhaps for the purpose of
improving the chances that Congressman Eilberg would assist the
Administration to get several pieces of high priority legislation through
the Judiciary Committee, President Carter called the Congressman.
During the call, Congressman Eilberg complained about Marston
remaining in office and grumbled that all Marston did was prosecute
Democrats.327
President Carter promptly called his Attorney General to inquire
about the status of the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia. Bell had a
detailed recollection of the call. The Attorney General was being driven
to a Brooks Brothers store to shop for a suit. The President called on
the car phone, and Bell called the President back on the more secure
phone in the manager’s office at Brooks Brothers. The President asked
about the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia, and Bell replied that he
planned to replace the U.S. Attorney in early 1978. Carter told Bell to
hurry up, because Congressman Eilberg was complaining about the

Id. at 210.
Safire, supra note 302, at 544.
325 Id. at 542, 544; BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 210.
326 Safire, supra note 302, at 542.
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Attorney General, the slow process, and the U.S. Attorney who “doesn’t
do anything but prosecute Democrats.” Bell promised to hurry.328
What neither Carter nor Bell knew during that early November call
was that Congressman Eilberg was under investigation by federal
authorities, including U.S. Attorney David Marston, for corruption
relating to the construction of a hospital in Philadelphia.329 So, the
President had personally spoken to a Congressman under investigation
and asked the Attorney General to carry out the Congressman’s request
that the prosecutor on the case be removed. The seriousness of the
potential appearance of impropriety is difficult to overstate. Although
neither the President nor the Attorney General knew of the
investigation, the circumstantial evidence strongly indicated that
Congressman Eilberg did know about the investigation; it appeared
that the President may have been an unwitting participant in the
Congressman’s attempt to derail the investigation.330 When Bell told his
subordinates that the President wanted Marston’s removal expedited,
he too, appeared to be an unwitting participant.
When Marston spoke with a Department of Justice official in
mid-November to check on his status, Marston was told that he would
likely be removed because Eilberg had called the President and there
was “pressure from on high.”331 That Department official was not in the
Criminal Division and was unaware that Eilberg might be under
investigation. Marston immediately contacted a Department official in
the Criminal Division, one who was in the chain of command of the
investigation involving Eilberg, and shared his concern that politics
might be behind the attempt to remove him.332 Somehow, the
information that Congressman Eilberg was under investigation by
Marston’s office did not get to Bell until much later, and there were
conflicts in the accounts of Department officials about who knew what
and when.333
About two months later, in early January 1978, the media in
Philadelphia reported that the Attorney General was trying to remove
Marston at the urging of Congressman Eilberg, who was under
investigation by Marston’s office. There was a firestorm of reporting
that raised the specter that the Carter Administration was improperly

Safire, supra note 302, at 539; BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 210–11.
BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 211.
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politicizing the appointment process, or worse. The problem was
compounded when the President, at a press conference, first insisted
that he had “not interfered at all,” with the Marston matter nor
discussed it with Bell, but then conceded that Congressman Eilberg had
asked that Marston be removed and that he had called the Attorney
General.334
The proximate cause of this disastrous situation was that
information concerning a Congressman being under investigation was
not shared with the Attorney General in a timely manner. When Bell
finally learned that Congressman Eilberg was under investigation, the
news shook him, and “the whole ball game changed.”335 This was a
serious breakdown, but while accounts conflicted concerning which
subordinate officials knew and when they knew, the Department’s
internal investigation concluded that the Attorney General did not
know until after the above-described damage was done.336 One
consequence of the Marston affair was that Bell instituted Department
procedures requiring that the Attorney General be notified whenever a
public figure becomes the subject of an investigation. But in the case at
hand, the information came to Bell too late.337
Having learned that there was, in fact, a serious criminal
investigation involving Marston’s office that implicated Congressman
Eilberg and others, the question remained: should Marston be removed
as U.S. Attorney? Bell sent a team of Department lawyers to
Philadelphia to do an assessment of whether replacing Marston would
compromise the investigation. That assessment determined that there
would be no long-term disruption if Marston were replaced.338 Bell, who
regretted not removing Marston a year earlier and suspected that
Marston was manipulating the situation to preserve his job, resolved to
remove Marston as U.S. Attorney.
That set the stage for a final dramatic scene in the Marston affair.
Rather than sending an intermediary to inform Marston of his removal,
Bell asked Marston to come to Washington for a meeting. Bell regretted
handling the dismissal in this way, especially when the meeting became
the subject of intense press coverage. Anticipation escalated when the
BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 212; see Safire, supra note 302, at 547–48.
Safire, supra note 302, at 547.
336 Memorandum on Replacement of David Marston as United States Attorney from
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility, to Wade H.
McCree, Jr., Solicitor General (Jan. 23, 1978) reprinted in Nomination of Benjamin R.
Civiletti to be Deputy Attorney General, supra note 302, at 558–59.
337 BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 27, at 212.
338 Id.
334
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gathered press contingent waited several hours while Marston was
delayed by travel conditions caused by poor weather. When the meeting
finally occurred, it was short and to-the-point. Bell told Marston that he
could stay on the job until his replacement was appointed. Marston said
that he would stay on the job only if he could serve the entire balance of
President Carter’s term. Marston’s position must have confirmed Bell’s
suspicion that Marston was trying to engineer the outcome he wanted,
and the Attorney General could not abide that.
When the meeting was over, Marston stepped out of the Attorney
General’s office to meet the throng of press. Marston told them he had
been “fired.”339 Bell not only regretted staging the confrontation with
Marston, but having done so, he further regretted that he “abandoned
the field” by not immediately responding to Marston’s statement.340 By
the time the Department attempted to counter Marston’s narrative, the
public relations damage was done. The press had a field day. There was
“a firestorm of charges that political influence had corrupted the
administration of justice.”341 The perception was created that the
Administration had interfered with an investigation for political
purposes. Marston was portrayed as a martyr. The Marston affair had
been a debacle. Bell confided to a Department colleague that “a man
from the South had not taken such a whippin’ in Pennsylvania since
Gettysburg.”342
There are two brief postscripts worth mentioning.343 One is that
Congressman Eilberg eventually lost re-election and later pleaded
guilty to corruption charges that were prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney
appointed by President Carter. The other is that Marston used his
newfound fame to re-enter politics but was unsuccessful. He first lost a
bid for Governor of Pennsylvania and later lost a campaign for Mayor of
Philadelphia.344
The Marston affair graphically illustrates some of the greatest
challenges of being Attorney General. In the hierarchy of decision
making in the Department of Justice, few matters reach the Attorney
General’s desk for personal decision that do not involve thorny
problems requiring tough calls where any choice will engender
controversy and criticism. Despite the fact that, by Bell’s own account,
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he made serious mistakes in handling the Marston affair, we believe
that the episode yields several important lessons for future Attorneys
General. First of all, Bell took responsibility for the errors made on his
watch. He forthrightly acknowledged the missteps. He didn’t try to shift
the blame. He took ownership. He told his colleagues that he felt he had
let the President down. He even considered resignation.345 And in doing
all this amidst a firestorm of controversy, he gained credibility as a
leader among his colleagues at the Department of Justice.
Second, an Attorney General must be aware of the bureaucratic
problems that are inherent in running an enormous organization.
During the Marston affair, there was a glaring failure to communicate
critical information needed by decision makers at the top of the chain of
command. Had the Attorney General known from the outset that
Congressman Eilberg was under serious scrutiny by the U.S. Attorney
in Philadelphia, most of the regrettable aspects of the Marston affair,
including the President communicating with Eilberg and acting on the
request to ask Bell to remove Marston, would have been avoided. To
address the serious bureaucratic lapse that occurred, Bell instituted
new procedures requiring notice up the chain of command of all
sensitive investigations involving public figures.346
Third, and most importantly, the Marston affair illustrates that
perceptions inadvertently created can overwhelm reality. The Attorney
General must be acutely aware of the media environment and the risk
that misimpressions can be accepted as truth. In the Marston affair,
this happened in a disastrous way, especially because the
misimpressions created—including that the President and Attorney
General were removing a U.S. Attorney to protect a corrupt political
crony—were directly at odds with the Attorney General’s core mission
of restoring the Department after Watergate and the President’s
campaign pledges of clean government.
Part of the Attorney General’s job on this score is preventative. For
example, inviting David Marston to Washington for a confrontation
covered by the press surely reinforced the misimpression that the
Attorney General was acting in a heavy-handed political manner. The
other part of the Attorney General’s job is curative. To use the same
example, when David Marston emerged from the meeting and
announced his “firing,” the Attorney General should have countered
Marston’s statement with a forthright explanation of why the personnel
change was made.
345
346
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Although Bell regretted not immediately answering Marston, Bell
did take curative public relations actions during the Marston affair.
One notable example was that after the Marston affair had become a
public controversy, several journalists, including William Safire of the
New York Times, began investigating and preparing hard-hitting
articles about the matter. Bell spoke to Safire on the record, knowing it
was almost certain that Safire’s article would not be positive in tone. In
fact, the article did not have a positive tone, but Bell’s detailed,
on-the-record contributions balanced some the negative information and
created the impression that the Attorney General was not afraid of the
story. And despite the overall negative tone of Safire’s lengthy piece,
Safire felt compelled to make clear to the reader that Griffin Bell was “a
good and honest public official.”347 Even amidst controversy and
criticism, the Attorney General should honestly state the facts,
including inconvenient ones.
The Marston affair was a setback for Bell, the kind of setback that
plagues every Attorney General. The episode struck at Bell’s central
mission of restoring the independence and reputation of the
Department of Justice after Watergate. Bell not only weathered the
firestorm, but demonstrated strength of character, acknowledged
errors, and exercised leadership informed by hard-learned lessons,
enabling him to go on to take a place, alongside Edward Levi, as a
champion and restorer of the Department of Justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been said that history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.348
That aphorism is appropriate when it comes to the periodic
politicization of the United States Department of Justice and the Office
of Attorney General of the United States. Throughout our history, from
time-to-time Attorneys General and senior Department of Justice
officials have abused their power and engaged in partisan political
activities.
The fact that politicization is predictable does not make it any less
dangerous. It is incumbent upon those who care about the independence
of the Department to try to minimize the danger. We believe that the
lessons of history need to play a big role in this endeavor. In particular,
the service of Edward Levi and Griffin Bell in the aftermath of the
Safire, supra note 302, at 550.
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Nixon Administration’s highly-politicized Justice Department tells us
much about what it takes to restore and then preserve the proper role of
the Department. It is largely a matter of character, and the character
trait that is most in need is independence. The need for independence
will always be in tension with the need for the Attorney General to be a
team player when it comes to politics-as-policy, but the Attorney
General (and, for that matter, every other senior Justice Department
official) must be someone who has the professional stature and strength
of character to resist the temptation or an instruction to use the
Department of Justice for partisan purposes. It is our hope that future
Presidents choose Attorney General nominees with this in mind and
that the Senate considers every nominee’s ability and disposition to
serve with this kind of independence.
Both Levi and Bell made valedictory speeches to the lawyers of the
Department of Justice in the days before they left office. The themes of
these two events were, unsurprisingly, similar. They looked back with
pride at what they had accomplished and acknowledged that the job is
never done. Levi said, “[W]e have shown a willingness to confront
problems directly, to deal with them as openly as possible, to have
placed the administration of justice on a foundation of fairness and not
upon favor.”349 In the same breath he conceded, “Of course problems
remain—that is the life of the law.”350
Bell expressed pride in what the Department had become and
optimism that it would resist future temptations towards partisanship:
“The Department must be recognized by all citizens as a neutral zone,
in which neither favor nor pressure nor politics is permitted to influence
the administration of the law. This Department is such a neutral zone
now, and with the help of all of you, it will remain so.”351 As long as
people care about the independence of the Department of Justice, the
examples of Edward Levi and Griffin Bell should resonate—even
rhyme, if need be—as future Attorneys General face inevitable
pressures to politicize their powerful office.
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